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Why should we care about nature? The question seems irrelevant; we
just do. Today, more people than ever flock to the mountains, rivers, and
deserts for an authentic outdoor experience. Undeterred by flash floods, bear
attacks, hypo- and hyper-thermia, and other inherent dangers of the wilds,
eco-travelers are donning their packs and heading down the trail. For
those with the resources to travel abroad, international "ecotourism" has
become the trend. Further, the greatest increases in outdoor recreation are
occurring in the seemingly nature-friendly activities of birding, hiking,
and backpacking.' Trees may not have standing, but they have constituents. 2
They, along with the rest of nature, have laws designed at least in part to
protect them.
3
Why should we care about nature? The question seems pass6. Yet on
closer inspection, it appears that nature-the idea, the place, the commu-
nity of life-is being displaced and even threatened by something more akin
to NatureTM, or Nature@, the product. Socialites and mail carriers alike
* Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law. I am grateful to Paul
Campos, John Carlson, James Corbridge, David Getches, Melissa Hart, Hiroshi Motomura,
Scott Peppet, Carolyn Ramsey, Joseph Sax, Amy Schmitz, Pierre Schlag, Christopher
Stone, and Ahmed White for their careful readings of earlier drafts. Thanks in addition to
all participants in the University of Colorado School of Law Summer Article Workshop.
Katie Corr, Brittany Kauffman, and Elizabeth Purcell provided excellent and spirited re-
search assistance as well as delightful company throughout this project. Finally, I would
like to thank Chris Giovinazzo and the staff of the Harvard Environmental Law Review,
who did a great editing job in the final stretches when the Article needed it most.
' See H. KEN CORDELL ET AL., OUTDOOR RECREATION IN AMERICAN LIFE: A NATIONAL
ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND AND SUPPLY TRENDS 239 (H. Ken Cordell, ed., 1999) [hereinafter
OUTDOOR RECREATION] (containing results from the 1994-95 National Survey on Recrea-
tion and the Environment, USDA Forest Service). According to the survey, bird watching
is the most rapidly growing form of outdoor recreation, and participation in hiking, back-
packing, and camping is also showing phenomenal growth. Id. The only activities
classified by the survey as "land-resource-based activities" that declined in participation
were horseback riding and hunting. Id.
2 See generally Christopher Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Towards Legal Rights
of Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972) (arguing that natural objects have value
unto themselves and not solely based on their value to humans, and therefore should have
independently cognizable legal rights).
'See, e.g., National Wilderness Preservation System Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136
(2000); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000); National Forest Man-
agement Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (2000); Federal Lands Policy Management Act, 43
U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785 (2000).
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pay $65,000 to climb Mount Everest.4 Corporate seminars in backcountry
terrain purport to improve business acumen. Urbanites set off in their
sport utility vehicles ("SUVs") for mountain escapes armed with cell-
phones, espresso makers, and global positioning systems. Travelers from
developed countries swarm the globe in search of pristine rain forests and
encounters with endangered tigers. The vast increase in outdoor recrea-
tion has coincided with the commodification of nature and wilderness
experiences herein termed the "consumption of wilderness."
This trend may appear disconnected from refined discussions within
the academy concerning whether and how to include nature in the moral
community. But an understanding of the consumption of wilderness sheds
significant light on the perceived dichotomy between two common views
of the ethical value of nature. The anthropocentric view holds that na-
ture's ethical value derives solely from nature's value to humans, whether
spiritual, aesthetic, economic, or otherwise. The non-anthropocentric view
maintains that nature has inherent value, apart from any value to hu-
mans.' The ensuing analysis of the consumption of wilderness reveals that
whatever their philosophical merit, positions advanced from within both
camps misdescribe the complex ways in which humans interact with, un-
derstand, and affect the natural world. We lack an adequate answer to the
question of why we should care about nature unless we understand the
distinctly social phenomena associated with the consumption of wilder-
ness. Others have written eloquently and convincingly about the collapse
of the distinction between the anthropocentric and the inherent value
camps.6 The notion that we need more holistic understandings of our ethical
relationship to nature is not original to this Article. What is new, and
necessary, is an exploration of these holistic ideas in the context of the
4 See JONATHAN KRAKAUER, INTO THIN AIR 7, 30, 44-45, 47, 149-52 (1997) (de-
scribing private clients Doug Hansen, a postal worker who worked two jobs to save enough
to attempt Everest for a second time, and Sandy Hill Pittman, a New York millionaire and
socialite).
'This debate mirrors aspects of the subject/object question, a long-standing problem
in philosophy. Ever since Descartes' elevation of the subject (i.e., the conscious human
mind) over the object (i.e., all non-human elements of the natural world), see Rene Des-
cartes, The Meditations Concerning First Philosophy, in PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 81-91,
126-43 (Laurence J. Lafleur trans., Bobbs-Merrill Educ. Publ'g 1978) (1641) (exploring the
primacy of mind and the separation between mind and body), the question of whether to
conceive of humans as a part of or separate from nature has been a confounding one.
6 See Mark Sagoff, Settling America or the Concept of Place in Environmental Ethics,
12 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 349, 402-09 (1992) (describing necessary
rapprochement between preservationist/inherent value camp and conservationist/anthropo-
centric camp, and suggesting an attitude of engagement with place as the appropriate ethi-
cal paradigm); see also CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, EARTH AND OTHER ETHICS: THE CASE
FOR MORAL PLURALISM 242-46 (1987) (arguing that no universal postulate can fit the
range of situations that call for moral decision-making, and therefore urging instead for
different moral planes, the choices between which depend on intuition and imagination
rather than purely rational argumentation from first principles).
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very activities that many assume to be inherently capable of generating
those understandings.
This Article begins by considering Professor Joseph Sax's explora-
tion of many of these same wilderness-oriented activities. In his book
Mountains Without Handrails,7 Sax articulates an argument from within
the anthropocentric camp in support of nature preservation. Why, Sax asks,
should large swathes of public lands be free from development and mo-
torized recreation? He concludes that the justification lies in the kinds of
activities in which such places allow us to participate. Wild places pro-
vide us with the ideal conditions for "contemplative" or "reflective" rec-
reation. Such recreational activities, including backpacking, rock climb-
ing, fly-fishing, and mountaineering, require us to be creative, self-directed,
and engaged in ways that other activities do not. Sax urges us to heed the
"secular prophets" of preservation, who preach the gospel of these types
of recreation, because they, like those who promote public television and
other eat-your-vegetables types of public goods, know from their own
nature experiences something about what is good for us all.' Sax's argu-
ment is an important step in pushing anthropocentric justifications toward
a more expansive definition of nature's value. As discussed below, how-
ever, Sax's justification ultimately requires reformulation in light of the
ways more and more people are actually experiencing nature-i.e., the
consumption of wilderness.
Next, this Article updates and expands on Sax's review of outdoor
activities. When Sax wrote his book, outdoor recreation was already popular
enough for preservationists to wonder whether we were "loving our na-
tional parks to death."9 Since then, however, the changes are even more
dramatic, and are qualitative as well as quantitative. Wilderness is being
consumed in several senses. In the world of natural resource law and policy,
"consumption" typically means extractive activities such as mining, tim-
ber harvesting, hunting, and grazing. Non-mechanized recreational activi-
ties, by contrast, are usually considered "non-consumptive." Even in this
conventional sense, the scale and pace of many non-mecha-nized activities
are now consumptive; they result in drastic physical alteration of the
land. In other contexts, consumption means monetary exchange-the pur-
chase and sale of services and commodities. In this sense as well, wilder-
ness is being consumed. Its transformation into a commodity affects our
relationship to it, in that the acquisition of wilderness experiences has
psychic and social meaning quite apart from the meaning of the experi-
ences themselves.
Coming to terms with these aspects of the consumption of wilder-
ness demands that the ethics of wilderness and nature preservation incor-
7 JOSEPH SAX, MOUNTAINS WITHOUT HANDRAILS (1980).
8 Id. at 15 ("[The preservationist] is, in fact, a prophet for a kind of secular religion.").
9 Id. at 1.
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porate the understanding that wilderness is not a realm cordoned off from
the rest of society. What people watch on television, read in magazines,
see in the cinema, experience at the workplace, and consume in the mar-
ketplace influences how they interact with all places, including wild places.
And what we seek in wild places may be increasingly hard to find unless
we understand the connections between an economic system based on
extremely high levels of production and consumption and its impacts on
us as well as the environment. °
The questions raised with respect to how we engage in wilderness
activities thus pertain to a nuanced inquiry into the underpinnings of a
moral relationship to nature. These questions include the following: How
has wilderness travel changed? What are people seeking when they en-
gage in highly commodified wilderness experiences? What do they find?
What impact does this behavior have on society and wilderness, and to what
extent are society and wilderness separable? The preliminary analysis
undertaken herein reveals that at least some of the underlying motivations
for even the most commercialized and extravagant escapades in the wil-
derness seem to be the very same motivations that Sax identified with con-
templative recreation. People, even encased in name-brand, state-of-the-
art, nature-proofed suits and toting Dean & Deluca coffee, are seeking
10 Many scholars and environmental advocates have made the general connection be-
tween habits of consumption and environmental degradation. See, e.g., Bradley A. Harsch,
Consumerism and Environmental Policy: Moving Past Consumer Culture, 26 ECOLOGY L.
Q. 543 (1999) (contending that consumerism lies at the heart of environmental problems
and that the cultural roots of our environmentally destructive practices must be addressed
with as much vigor as technical solutions); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Populations, Consump-
tion and Environmental Law, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. 89, 142 (1997) ("Environ-
mental degradation is due to our population, consumption and the pollution we generate.").
The first prominent American environmentalist to make the connection between consump-
tion and global environmental health was Barry Commoner in his groundbreaking book.
BARRY COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE (1971). Dr. Commoner's work was part of a
growing recognition that activities with respect to the environment are more likely than not
to have long-term effects on ecosystems. Rachel Carson and Stewart Udall also contributed
significantly to the public's comprehension of the society/environment connection. See
generally RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (Houghton Mifflin 1994) (1962); STEWART
UDALL, THE QUIET CRISIS (1963). Many, including Sax, have likewise noted and ap-
plauded the shift in environmental protection from issue- and place- specific regulation to
bioregional and ecosystem-based approaches. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Nature and Habitat
Conservation in the United States, 20 ECOLOGY L. Q. 47 (1993) (describing and advocat-
ing a shift from an "enclave-based" approach to nature protection-focused mainly on pre-
serving beautiful and pristine places-to a more holistic approach of "ecological manage-
ment"); see also Richard J. Ansson, Ecosystem Management and Our National Parks: Will
Ecosystem Management Become the Guiding Theory for Our National Parks in the 21st
Century?, 7 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 87 (2000); John Freemuth, Ecosystem Management and
its Place in the National Parks, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 697 (1997); Oliver A. Houck, On the
Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management, 81 MINN. L. REV. 869 (1997); Bradley C.
Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1997). Exploring highly con-
sumptive behavior in the very activities that were once identified as the most solicitous and
generative of nature protection may have the beneficial effect of bolstering justifications
for both of these projects, as well as strengthening the connections between them. See
Sagoff, supra note 6, at 416-17.
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something akin to an unmediated experience, or even something like moral
improvement, at least some of the time. In some respects, the channeling of
our seemingly inconsistent desires for status, individuality, and commu-
nity into leisure-time pursuits is perhaps a timely answer to the problem
of over-consumption of material goods. Yet there is also evidence to con-
clude that we are consuming nature faster than it is consuming our leisure
time. In some cases, despite their stated goals and motivations, nature trav-
elers limit themselves to a sanitized, convenient, and trophy-home version
of wilderness. In others, the quest for increasingly wild experiences sev-
ers intimate connections to the natural world, and contributes, albeit un-
wittingly, to the physical destruction of wild places. Both kinds of pur-
suits threaten not only the idea of contemplative recreation, but also the
quite material conditions in which it takes place. This Article suggests,
therefore, that our quest for a relationship to nature must be reconsidered.
The sense, affirmed by Sax's argument, that we can go "out there" into na-
ture and come back the better for it, lacks two crucial recognitions.
The material objects of nature matter-the anthropocentric value of
nature cannot exist unless nature has intrinsic value. Sax himself puts
"harm to nature" arguments to one side in formulating his argument in
support of preservation. 1 But we experience, or long to experience, the
subjective benefits of intimacy with nature because of its physical quali-
ties and conditions. We value those conditions-dew-moistened morn-
ings in aspen groves, the trill of a canyon wren on a still desert eve, the
spine-tingling howl of a wolf-precisely because, paradoxically, they enable
an experience of the infinite, the incalculable, of something not captured
by our subjective valuations. Sax's anthropocentric justification must
marry with aspects of the "inherent value of nature" side of the debate.
Yet self and nature are never just separate-neither socially nor con-
ceptually. This communion is precisely why we experience such intense
gratification from wilderness experiences and confirms the sense of the
inherent value adherents that there is a "there" to nature; there is, in philo-
sophical terms, an "object." This holistic understanding illuminates how
our social practices can, even in the name of appreciating nature, mutate
it. Herein lies the second recognition. If we are to understand why the mate-
rial, non-human objects of nature matter, we must appreciate and under-
stand our own inescapably social relationship with nature. Only in this way
can we hope to appreciate how our own valuations of nature can, them-
selves, paradoxically destroy what we seek to preserve. And only through
this appreciation will we be able to articulate the need for mountains with-
out handrails and wilderness without cellphones.
I See SAX, supra note 7, at 11-13 (asserting that the preservationist's objection to
certain activities and improvements is not always, or even centrally, about negative effects
on the environment).
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Part II of this Article describes Joseph Sax's anthropocentric view of
the value of nature. Part III explores both the continuing validity and the
limitations in Sax's thesis, by surveying the quantitative and qualitative
changes in outdoor recreation that have occurred over the last several dec-
ades. Part IV describes the intellectual roots and present manifestations
of the position that nature has intrinsic value, and describes both the ap-
peal of this approach as well as its shortcomings in light of the consump-
tion of wilderness. Finally, Part IV suggests a reconciliation of the intrin-
sic value and Saxian views, but one that depends upon recognition of the
inevitably social lens through which we relate to nature, notwithstanding
the fact that we sense and long for connections that extend beyond those
mediated by society.
II. THE "CONTEMPLATIVE FACULTY" JUSTIFICATION FOR
WILDERNESS PRESERVATION
Professor Sax distilled the ideal qualities for recreation in national
parks and other public lands from an 1865 report by Frederick Law Olm-
sted entitled, "The Yosemite Valley and the Mariposa Big Trees."12 In this
report, Olmsted, the designer of New York's Central Park and one of this
country's premier landscape architects, made the case for the redemptive
qualities of national parks. 13 Olmsted was concerned with "why govern-
ment should take upon itself the burden of scenic preservation."'4 Ulti-
mately, he rested the justification on an environmental strain of republican
idealism. Olmsted argued that magnificent scenery of the kind available
in nature stimulates the inherently human capacity to contemplate and
reflect. 5 As Sax summarizes, "it is precisely to give the ordinary citizen an
opportunity to exercise and educate the contemplative faculty that estab-
lishment of nature parks as public places is 'justified and enforced as a
political duty.""' 6 Nature parks allow for the free roaming of the human
spirit and intelligence. The setting is a precondition for activities that culti-
vate human independence, curiosity, and self-directed thought.
It is also clear from Olmsted's writings, and Sax's revival of them, that
Olmsted prefigures many of the anti-modernist sentiments of the moun-
12 See id. at 18 (citing Frederick Law Olmsted, The Yosemite Valley and the Mariposa
Big Trees: A Preliminary Report (1865), reprinted in 44:1 LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTURE 12
(1953)).
13 Olmsted was writing at the very beginning of the era in which public lands were set
aside for purposes other than homesteading, mineral extraction, or other commercial pur-
poses. While he, and Sax, use the term "park," the arguments apply to any area of land set
aside and protected in its natural state. See id. at 115 n.2 (explaining that he is using the
term "national parks" as shorthand for all of the categories of public land that are or ought
to be protected as "high quality natural areas").
14See id. at 19.
1' Id. at 20.
16 SAX, supra note 7. at 21 (quoting Olmsted, supra note 12, at 21).
[Vol. 27
Wilderness Without Cellphones
taineering and rock climbing cultures of subsequent decades. The "com-
mon man" needs to reawaken his contemplative and reflective faculties
because they are otherwise hopelessly dulled by his participation in mod-
ern society, its labor force, and its industrialized leisure activities:
In most of our activities we are busy accomplishing things to
satisfy the demands and expectations of other people, and deal-
ing with petty details that are uninteresting in themselves and
only engage our attention because they are a means to some other
goal we are trying to reach.17
Nature, according to Olmsted and Sax, serves as an antidote to modem
working life because it frees us from the goal-oriented, other-directed, often
mundane tasks that characterize most people's everyday activities."' Natural
settings free us because they inspire us to dwell thoughtfully and inten-
tionally in the moment. 9 Olmsted's argument resonates with the same
kinds of eastern-inspired arguments found in counter-cultural classics such
as Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance.0 The message is that hu-
mans thrive in environments that require them to transcend their external
goals and pay heed to the present in an active, engaged way. Therefore, we
as a society have an obligation to ensure that such environments exist.
Naturally scenic areas constitute such environments, and the government
thus has a duty to protect and preserve them for the public.
To provide support for Olmsted's "contemplative faculty" justification,
Professor Sax elaborates on the kinds of activities that most lend them-
selves to contemplation and reflection.2" Sax interprets the meaning of
"Id. at 20.
18 See Olmsted, supra note 12, at 20.
The severe and excessive exercise of the mind which leads to the greatest fatigue
and is the most wearing upon the whole constitution is almost entirely caused by
application to the removal of something to be apprehended in the future ... , to
the laying up of wealth .... to accomplishing something in the mind of another,
and especially to small and petty details which are uninteresting in themselves
and which engage the attention at all only because of the bearing they have on
some general end of more importance which is seen ahead.
Id.
19 See id. at 20-21 (contending that "natural scenery" is unique in its ability to engage
completely in the present, without concern for some future or external goal).
20 
ROBERT M. PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE (1974). This
cult classic explores metaphysical questions through the narrative of a father and son's
relationship to each other, the natural world, and a motorcycle. Engagement, whether
through fixing the motorcycle or bushwhacking up a mountain, is one of the recurrent re-
demptive themes. While Sax does not mention this work, he does refer to EUGEN HERRI-
GEL, ZEN AND THE ART OF ARCHERY (1971) by way of recognizing that the kinds of con-
templative activities associated with natural settings are not necessarily dependent upon
those settings. See SAX, supra note 7, at 46.
21 See SAX, supra note 7, at 27-46.
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these activities by analyzing the texts of their participants. These texts-
the chronicles of fly-fishing, hunting, and mountain climbing-have tra-
ditionally been consumed as popular entertainment. But Sax urges us to
take them more seriously.22 Within them, he explains, are the kernels of
an ethical argument for nature preservation. These narratives inform us
that such activities, which by definition take place in natural settings, give us
the opportunity to confront our most visceral and arguably troubling ten-
dencies, and then to transcend them. According to Sax, this is particu-
larly true of mountain climbing. Whereas fly-fishing may appear to have
an inherently reflective aspect to it-the only goal one has to abandon is
the goal of actually catching fish-mountaineers seem to have many of
the macho, goal-oriented traits that one associates with mechanized rec-
reation.23 Yet the mountain climbing narratives stress the need to transcend
these tendencies. Sax relies on one particular mountaineering text to
make this point.24 According to Galen Rowell's In the Throne Room of
the Mountain Gods:
The climbing experience at its best-"enjoyed purely for itself,"
as Rowell puts it, adopting almost the identical words Olmsted
used in the Yosemite report-requires a detachment from the
pressure of conventional expectations that is extremely difficult
to achieve. The interest of climbing is not simply that it tends to
attract those who feel these external pressures sharply, but that it
induces the participant to confront this inner conflict rather than
conceal it.25
Sax surveys other kinds of texts that support the contemplative or reflec-
tive recreation justification. Henry David Thoreau, John Muir, and even
Faulkner and Hemingway, lend support for the idea that certain outdoor
activities stimulate and engage us in ways that elevate our senses and
capabilities. 26 Whether rambling through the underbrush of Walden Pond,
ascending a craggy rock face, or standing thigh deep in clear mountain
streams, the recurring message is that natural places allow us opportuni-
ties for this engagement. "The fundamental claim for what may be called
reflective or contemplative recreation, then, is as an experimental test of
an ethical proposition. Such recreation tests the will to dominate and the
inclination to submissiveness, and repays their transcendence with pro-
found gratification. '27
22 See id. at 27..
23 See id. at 37-38.
24 See id. at 36-39 (discussing GALEN ROWELL, IN THE THRONE ROOM OF THE
MOUNTAIN GODS (1977)).
2 Id. at 39 (quoting ROWELL, supra note 24, at 110).
26 See SAX, supra note 7, at 40-44.271 d. at 45.
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The balance of Sax's book shores up the reflective recreation justifica-
tion by, in large part, recognizing its limits. It may well be, Sax acknowl-
edges, that many are either incapable of or uninterested in the benefits of
reflective recreation. 2 The benign form of paternalism that preservation-
ists advocate, however, is similar to such generally accepted forms as fund-
ing for public television, art museums, and public universities. We all ought
to want such things, and therefore ought to support their existence, even
if the majority does not actually recognize their value or take advantage
of them.29 We should defer to the preservationists and their special knowl-
edge in this regard just as we defer to art historians and museum curators in
their fields of expertise. Sax's ethical argument is thus neo-Kantian,
rather than utilitarian. It describes preservationists as the formulators of a
categorical imperative for outdoor recreation: their subjective experience
of reflective recreation becomes the basis of a universal principle about
how we should interact with nature. This approach avoids a problem pre-
sented by a pure utilitarian argument, which would be vulnerable to con-
tentions about what the majority actually prefers.30 Moreover, the sphere
in which the preservationist is asking for deference-the activities that
take place on certain designated public lands-is limited. Allowing pres-
ervationists authority in such narrow circumstances is not so threatening
that it must be justified absolutely.3
The "secular prophets"-those backpackers, climbers, fly-fishers,
and wanderers who have chronicled their experiences-have insights and
expertise that we should heed, concludes Sax. They are telling us how we
might lead a better life by, for at least some of our time, leaving behind
all that is quick, easy, conventional, and externally driven. The belief that
we can become better people is central to Sax's argument, as is the dual-
istic view of people and nature: leave nature alone, and people who enter
there will improve. Sax does hint that there are signs that the secular proph-
ets' world might be threatened by increasing commercialization.3 2 But,
28 See id. at 47-48 (recognizing that one's choices concerning how to recreate may be
limited by the alienated, drudge-like conditions of one's working life); see also id. at 50-
51 (acknowledging that the preservationists are arguing for policies reflecting what they
think we ought to want, not necessarily what the majority actually chooses).
29 See id. at 52-54.
30 SAX, supra note 7, at 54-55. But see Charles Wilkinson, Mountains Without Hand-
rails: Reflections on the National Parks by Joseph L. Sax, 12 ENVTL. L. 523, 524 (1982)
(book review) (characterizing Sax's argument as "ultimately utilitarian," because it focuses
on the value of public lands to the user). I think that Sax's argument is more properly char-
acterized as neo-Kantian, because it is grounded in what all recreators ought to want, not
what they may actually want.
31 See SAX, supra note 7, at 55.
32 See id. at 40 (noting that a commercial climbing venture at Mt. Rainier promised to
get clients to the top, even if it meant dragging them), 47-48 (discussing the possibility
that efforts to reform our interactions with nature may be limited by the ways in which our
lives are constructed by our "alienated" and "drudge-like" work lives).
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overall, Sax's argument depends on the proposition that their message is
intact and relevant.
III. CONSUMING WILDERNESS
It is striking to update Sax's reading list today by reviewing modem
wilderness travel literature. Veteran mountaineers and climbers complain
that the qualities, distilled by Sax as pivotal to inducing reflection and con-
templation, such as self-reliance, complex problem solving, and inner-
directedness, are no longer an inherent part of their sport. In Dark Shad-
ows Falling, mountain climber and author Joe Simpson explores the cur-
rent moral climate of high altitude mountaineering and trekking, and
finds marked increases in callousness, disregard for others, and general
abdication of the mountaineer's distinct ethics.33 He wonders whether
"something was happening that had little to do with the mountaineering I
had been brought up to understand and love. Were we irrecoverably los-
ing the essence of why we went to the mountains; indeed had we already
lost it forever?"34 Those who chronicle other wilderness activities echo
these sentiments. Yet the current literature also reveals that the desire for
unmediated, intense, self-directed experiences is what, at some level, drives
the consumerist frenzy in the great outdoors.
The phenomena described herein therefore present two related
problems. First, the commodification of wilderness experiences erodes
the moral-improvement argument articulated by Sax, in that there is wide-
spread support for the proposition that the essential "contemplative" or
"reflective" aspects of wilderness activities have been undermined. Even
when people seek transcendence and higher states of awareness through
nature experiences, they do not achieve them. Second, commodification
often results in actual environmental harm, thereby destroying the very
qualities that draw us to wild places. Tragically, wilderness travelers de-
stroy the means of their deliverance even while they fail to be delivered.
A. Buying Your Way to the Top of the World
In terms of updating the mountaineering literature, a good place to
start is the highest peak, both literally and metaphorically. Mount Ever-
est, whose summit is the highest point on the planet, is also an exemplar
of the consumption of wilderness. What was once among the greatest
challenges for mountaineers has become, according to some, a high alti-
tude amusement park, albeit one with risks far greater than those inherent
in the Flopper.35 The commercialization of Everest lures many climbers-
33JOE SIMPSON, DARK SHADOWS FALLING (1997).
Id. at 28.
35 See Murphy v. Steeple Chase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1929) (announc-
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often people who are seeking the kind of nature experience Sax would ap-
plaud. Yet commercialization of Everest simultaneously ensures that any
summit these climbers achieve is unlikely to be a moral one.
The Everest phenomenon has been documented in many accounts.3 6
The best known of these is probably Jonathon Krakauer's Into Thin Air,
which spent more than two years on the New York Times Best Seller list.37
Writers describe a circus of groups, many of them led by companies that
have charged their clients significant sums of money, descending upon
the mountain during the peak climbing seasons.3" Standing in stark con-
trast to the minimalist, ascetic vision of the mountaineer espoused by Sax,
the denizens of Everest base camp are supplied with Coke, pizza, bagels,
and, incredibly, sushi.39 The clients, many of whom would not otherwise be
capable of such an arduous endeavor, are then led toward the summit.
Those clients who lack the skills and fitness to undertake high altitude
mountaineering unguided often have been led to believe, inchoately or
directly, that their credit card receipts guarantee them access to the top.4°
Some clients embody the problematic aspects of guided climbing
more than others. Krakauer himself is an expert mountaineer who has
honed his skills on many lonely, unknown peaks.41 Sandy Pittman, a cli-
ent on a rival expedition, most strikingly embodies the other end of the
spectrum. A rich socialite who had the goal of being the first American
ing the affirmative tort defense of "assumption of the risk"). Perhaps it is unfortunate that
Justice Cardozo is not around today to warn the "timorous" away from Everest.36See, e.g., KRAKAUER, supra note 4; ANATOLI BOUKREEV & G. WESTON DEWALT,
THE CLIMB: TRAGIC AMBITIONS ON EVEREST (1997); DAVID BREASHEARS, HIGH ExPo-
SURE: AN ENDURING PASSION FOR EVEREST AND UNFORGIVING PLACES (1999); BROUGH-
TON COBURN, EVEREST: MOUNTAIN WITHOUT MERCY (1997); MATT DICKINSON, THE
OTHER SIDE OF EVEREST: CLIMBING THE NORTH FACE THROUGH THE KILLER STORM
(1999); LENE GAMMELGAARD, CLIMBING HIGH: A WOMAN'S ACCOUNT OF SURVIVING THE
EVEREST TRAGEDY (1999); GORAN KROPP, ULTIMATE HIGH: MY SOLO ASCENT OF EVER-
EST (1999); JAMLING TENZING NORGAY, TOUCHING MY FATHER'S SOUL: A SHERPA'S
JOURNEY TO THE TOP OF EVEREST (2001); JIM WITTAKER, A LIFE ON THE EDGE: MEMOIRS
OF EVEREST AND BEYOND (1999).
7 See Paperback Best Sellers: April 1, 2001, N.Y TIMES, Apr. 1, 2001, § 7, at 20
(noting that INTO THIN AIR had been on the paperback bestseller list for 107 weeks); Best
Sellers: January 30, 2000, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2000, § 7, at 24 (noting that INTO THIN
AIR had been on the hardback bestseller list for 91 weeks).
3 See KRAKAUER, supra note 4, at 27-29, 42-45; see also SIMPSON, supra note 33, at
29-53 (describing the climbing scene on Everest, focusing on the 1996 storms and their
death toll). "On the Tibetan side it was an equally busy season, with more than 200 climb-
ers and their Sherpa staff-in all fifteen expeditions-camped on the site of the Rongbuck
glacier base camp." SIMPSON, supra note 33, at 43.
39 See Rod Nordland, The Gods Must be Angry, NEWSWEEK, May 26, 1997, at 44
("The camp itself was cushier than ever, supplied by daily chopper flights, with video
movies and propane heaters in some tents. The Malaysians even had Coca-Cola packed in
by Sherpas, while camp caterers cranked out bagels, pizza and sushi.").
40 See SIMPSON, supra note 33, at 111 (noting the ironic consequence of the warranty
mentality). "[T]here is a tendency to assume that success is guaranteed because it has been
paid for, and the consequent pressure to provide it can result in perilous situations." Id.
41 See JONATHAN KRAKAUER, EIGER DREAMS: VENTURES AMONG MEN AND MOUN-
TAINS (1990).
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woman to climb the Seven Summits (the highest peak on each continent),
Ms. Pittman arrived at base camp equipped with two laptop computers, a
video camera, three 35mm cameras, a digital camera, two tape recorders,
a CD player, solar panels, an espresso maker, an "ample supply" of Dean
& Delucca's Near East blend, and four wrapped chocolate Easter eggs. 42
When not adventuring at high altitudes, Ms. Pittman resides in an "opu-
lent Connecticut manor" and an "art-filled apartment on Central Park West
staffed with uniformed servants. '43 In the Himalayas, Ms. Pittman did not
depart from the style to which she had become accustomed, requiring a
young Sherpa to roll up her sleeping bag and pack her backpack for her
each morning.' Such details might be considered merely amusing up-
dates of the genteel style associated with some of the earliest mountain-
eering ventures. 5 Unlike earlier mountaineers, however, Ms. Pittman's
requirements literally extended to being dragged up the mountain. For a
fairly long stretch, Ms. Pittman was "short-roped" up by a Sherpa, meaning
that he attached Pittman to himself by a rope and pulled her along behind.6
Sax's contemplative recreation ideal depends upon the assumption
that mountaineering and wilderness sports like it offer us the settings in
which to overcome our goal-obsessed orientation. The extreme forms of
guiding endemic on Everest thus challenge Sax's ideal. Guides drag cli-
ents up the icy pitches to meet their goals, for which the clients have paid
dearly. Not all the dragging is as literal as in Sandy Pittman's case. Doug
Hansen, one of the clients on Krakauer's trip, had been lured back by
expert guide Rob Hall to attempt the summit a second time, having failed
to reach it on a previous trip. Hall essentially promised Hansen the top.
Tragically, Hall delivered his promise at the cost of Hansen's life.47 Guiding
thus has the potential to make the goal more precious than anything-
even life itself.
In terms of motivation, the clients cannot take all the blame for this.
We must assume that all of them, even easy targets like Pittman, had com-
plicated reasons for wanting to be successful mountaineers. In part, their
desires may be to distinguish themselves from peers in their class and
social groups.41 In part they may be engaging in individualized, and highly
42 KRAKAUER, supra note 4, at 152.
431d. at 150.
4Id. at 152.
45 See SHERRY B. ORTNER, LIFE AND DEATH ON MT. EVEREST: SHERPAS AND HIMALA-
YAN MOUNTAINEERING 33-35 (1999). Ortner notes that early British mountaineers came
predominately from the well-to-do upper-middle class, with high levels of education, and
engaged in such leisure time activities as chess and poetry reading. Ortner does clarify that
very few climbers were from the highest social class, and the ones who were "were gener-
ally held in deep suspicion unless they could prove themselves to be unsnobbish and so-
cially egalitarian." Id. at 34.
46 KRAKAUER, supra note 4, at 221.
41 See KRAKAUER, supra note 4, at 47, 264-66, 299-301.
48 Upper class adventure travel, and middle-class imitations of it, might in part be the
latest iteration of Thorstein Veblen's thesis that consumption is a form of communication
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romanticized, hedonism.49 Yet, in large part, they must also be seeking to
transcend both of those motivations. Engaging in something as painful,
arduous, and intense as high-altitude mountaineering simply cannot be
explained solely by these theories.
So what drives people to spend so much money to climb Everest? It
cannot be the same thing that drives people to go to resorts, where one pays
to have the inconveniences of daily life removed. Club Med, for example,
has so perfected the "escape" version of tourism that it has even elimi-
nated that pesky problem of confronting anything resembling local cul-
ture.50 You can be anywhere-Mexico, the Caribbean, South America-
and still be in the nowhere, liminal space of perpetual fun and relaxation.
Decades ago, Daniel Boorstin lamented the route that Americans were on
with respect to their desire to distance themselves from "reality."'" The
Club Med resort vacation might be Boorstin's apotheosis of "the lost art
of travel '"52
Yet climbing Mount Everest is not fun-not even with expert guides,
Sherpas, and Starbucks coffee at base camp. As Krakauer details, climb-
ing at high altitudes is not pleasurable in any ordinary sense.53 After de-
scribing the agonizingly tedious process of ascending a steep icy slope
by jumaring up a fixed rope,54 Krakauer editorializes that:
[T]he notion that climbers are merely adrenaline junkies chasing
a righteous fix is a fallacy, at least in the case of Everest ....
Above the comforts of Base Camp, the expedition in fact be-
came an almost Calvinistic undertaking. The ratio of misery to
pleasure was greater by an order of magnitude than any other
mountain I'd been on; I quickly came to understand that climb-
ing Everest was primarily about enduring pain. And in subject-
ing ourselves to week after week of toil, tedium, and suffering,
that signals wealth and social status. See generally THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF
THE LEISURE CLASS: AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF INSTITUTIONS (Dover Publications 3d ed.
1994) (1899).
49 See Colin Campbell, Consuming Goods and the Good of Consuming, in ETHICS OF
CONSUMPTION: THE GOOD LIFE, JUSTICE, AND GLOBAL STEWARDSHIP 139, 151 (David A.
Crocker & Toby Linden eds., 1998) (arguing that consumption, including tourism, is a way
of expressing individualized longing for self-expression and inherently insatiable desire to
realize romantic longings).
10 See Club Med, FAQ, at http://www.clubmed.comlcgi-bin/clubmed55/Statique/Faq/
index.jsp? (last visited Feb. 21, 2003) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Re-
view).
51 DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE IMAGE: A GUIDE TO PSEUDOEVENTS IN AMERICA (Vintage
Books 1992) (1961).
52 Id. at 77 ("From Traveler to Tourist: The Lost Art of Travel").
13 See KRAKAUER, supra note 4, at 175-77.
54 Ascending a rope with jumars involves moving up the rope with gadgets that tighten
as they slide down. One hoists the jumar attached to a foot, then stops, hoists the jumar
attached to the waist harness, then stops, and so on.
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it struck me that most of us were probably seeking, above all,
something like a state of grace.5
Professor Sax does not use these words exactly, but a "state of grace" is
akin to the goal of contemplative recreation. Sax suggests that non-
mechanized recreation in the wilds requires independent and often difficult
decision-making in the face of real risk. One must struggle, feel pain, and
overcome fears. One must make choices about how to react to unex-
pected events, such as icefalls and storms.5 6 This is one type of "reality"
that Boorstin exhorted us to return to as well. He excoriated the modern
forms of tourism, which strive to eliminate all discomfort and risk, and
which moreover aim to make one feel as if one is on an "adventure" none-
theless ."
It is simply impossible to remove all of the risk, pain, and tedium
from high altitude mountaineering. Those who choose to spend their holi-
days in near-hypoxic states, expending enormous amounts of energy even
while their bodies and minds waste away, must thus be after that state of
grace and transcendence of one's own competitive instincts that Kra-
kauer, Sax, and their predecessors describe. 8 Climbers on Everest, even
those who pay for guides, are, in part, "contemporary pilgrims," seeking
to be transformed and renewed by the sacred world of the journey.5 9
However, they are doing so in a manner that defeats their quest. While
Everest is not and can never be "Club Med, Nepal/Tibet," the guided
climbs up Everest map disturbingly well onto Boorstin's description of
"mass tourism." Boorstin accuses modern travelers of expecting so much
that we demand "illusions with which to deceive ourselves."' Among our
unrealistic expectations is the belief that we can "have a lifetime of ad-
venture in two weeks and all the thrills of risking ... life without any
real risk at all."61 Clients of guided climbs on Everest are likely guilty of
just such expectations. They seek to confront "reality" in its most ex-
treme, and least forgiving, form. But at the same time they have not pre-
pared themselves, either spiritually or physically, for such a confronta-
tion. Krakauer documents this lack of foresight on his guided trip. Many
of the clients wore brand new mountaineering boots, evidently not having
55 KRAKAUER, supra note 4, at 175-77.
56 See SAX, supra note 7, at 28-59.
57 See BOORSTIN, supra note 51, at 77-117.
51 The leading conservationists, Muir and Leopold, as well as their intellectual prede-
cessor, Thoreau, all describe similar states of engagement as means of transcending the
ordinary, while simultaneously becoming extremely grounded in the details of the natural
world. See infra text accompanying notes 200-215.
59 See Nelson H. H. Graburn, Tourism: The Sacred Journey, in HOSTS AND GUESTS:
THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF TOURISM 17-31 (Valene L. Smith ed., 1989); see also DEAN
MACCANNELL, THE TOURIST: A NEW THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (1976).
60 BOORSTIN, supra note 51, at 5.
61 Id. at 79-80 (emphasis added).
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trained enough even to break them in. One client realized that his cram-
pons, the metal-toothed contraptions that attach to one's boots and allow
one to grip on ice and packed snow, were not the proper size.62 Even more
worrisome, it became apparent to Krakauer that very few of his fellow
clients had done any training on actual mountains. Like most people with
day jobs, they were confined to Stairmasters and treadmills. He com-
mented that, "[t]his gave me pause. Physical conditioning is a crucial com-
ponent of mountaineering, but there are many equally important ele-
ments, none of which can be practiced in a gym."63 Many of the paying
clients rely on the consumer transaction of paying the guiding company
to insulate them from the risks that their lack of preparation would oth-
erwise invite. 4
The difficulties of inadequate preparation are compounded as the
circumstances become more precarious. Guides spend inordinate amounts
of time with the least competent climbers, making them less available to
the rest of the group and less able to assess circumstances overall.65 Just
as important as the effects of physical deficits, over-reliance on others in
extreme wilderness circumstances causes one to abdicate one's critical
faculties. As Sax observed, an inextricable aspect of mountaineering is
the responsibility one must take for his or her own life.' A mountaineer
makes decisions that determine, quite literally, whether she will live or
die. Some of the decisions are based on various forms of knowledge and
experience; others are more like hunches, though these too are the prod-
uct of accumulated experience. As Krakauer puts it, "[c]rusty old alpin-
ists who've survived a lifetime of close scrapes like to counsel the young
proteges that staying alive hinges on listening carefully to one's 'inner
voice."' 67 One's inner voice may be muffled if the voice of a guide, whom
one has paid dearly, supersedes it. In fact, many guided mountaineering
trips involve little to no independent decision making about when and
how to advance up the peak.68 Extreme forms of commercialized guiding
undermine the Sax ideal by replacing individual reliance on skill and de-
cisionmaking with goal orientation and the illusion of society.
In addition to undermining the contemplative recreation ideal, the
excesses on Everest raise a second problem: the risk of environmental
62 KRAKAUER, supra note 4, at 97.
63 Id. at 97.
6 See id.; see also BREASHEARS, supra note 36, at 27 (commenting that Rob Hall's cli-
ents "had come for a climb, not to take serious risks. Rob's expertise was supposed to be
their warranty against danger and Rob had let them down.").
65 See KRAKAUER, supra note 4, at 107 (noting that a junior guide on Krakauer's trip,
Andy Harris, spent one entire morning coaching one of the least prepared climbers through
one of the most treacherous parts of the climb, the Khumbu icefall).
6 See SAX, supra note 7, at 39 (describing the elaborate rules that mountaineers de-
velop to ensure that technology does not rob them of this self-reliance).
67 KRAKAUER, supra note 4, at 102.
68 See generally id. See also Interview with Peter Nichols in Boulder, Colo. (June 4,
1999) (notes on file with author).
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harm. The commercialization of Everest has turned one of the most re-
mote, pristine places in the world into a veritable garbage dump. The
various ascent routes are plagued with the detritus of previous climbs,
including dead bodies, empty oxygen bottles, cooking gas cylinders,
batteries, tents, frayed ropes, rusted sardine tins, metal cans, plastic bags,
aluminum, glass, clothes, cameras, binoculars, toilet paper, and remains
of a five-ton helicopter that crashed there in 1973.69 Alpinists have
dubbed the South Col, Everest's most popular climbing route, the "world's
highest junk yard. ' 70 In response, environmental groups have organized
clean-up expeditions, but even these well-intentioned efforts have barely
scratched the surface as far as eliminating the trash.71 In terms of broader
impacts on the surrounding Himalayan region, increased tourism may
create incentives to preserve and protect the unique environment that out-
siders pay to see, but there are also risks that increased travel and con-
sumption will harm more than help. Large numbers of tourists change
local patterns of consumption, resulting, for example, in increased use of
fuel wood, changed grazing patterns, and vast increases in garbage through-
out the region. 72
The lessons from Everest, from the preservationist point of view, are
therefore profoundly mixed, if not paradoxical. On the one hand, it seems
as if many are heeding Sax's secular prophets' message to spend leisure
time in such a way as to engage, interact, and awaken one's self in the
inherently challenging and awe-inspiring context of nature. In Boorstin's
vocabulary, people are seeking to transcend the "pseudo-event" and en-
gage in something "real." Many who seek to arrive at the top of the world
are modern pilgrims, in hopes of a glimpse of the sacred. Yet the means
by which people are seeking this, in the context of Everest, replicate the
worst aspects of passive recreation. The goal supersedes the process.
Self-reliance is evaded. The unique, organic ethics that others describe as
integral to climbing and mountaineering are abandoned. Mountaineers
themselves mourn these changes. Joe Simpson's entire book is devoted to
describing his perceptions of the degradation of the sport. 73 He laments
the expectation of assistance:
69 Jan Sharma, Too Many Tourists Build a Mountain of Problems, THE WORLDPAPER,
Sept. 9, 1997 (noting that Everest "has accumulated at least 50 tons of rubbish since it was
first conquered by Edmund Hillary and Tenzing Norgay Sherpa").70 
Id.
71 See Bob Klose, Mt. Everest Mission: Trash Local Journalist Joins Cleanup of Famed
Peak, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa, Cal.), May 18, 2000, at Al.
72 See Stanley F. Stevens, Tourism, Change, and Continuity in the Mount Everest Re-
gion, Nepal, 83 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 410 (1993). The author concludes that some envi-
ronmental effects of tourism in the region have been greatly overstated, but also notes the
adverse consequences of increased use of fuel wood, changes in grazing patterns, and vast
volumes of garbage. Id. at 422-24.
" See SIMPSON, supra note 33, at 11-23, 48, 118 (discussing particular instances of
what Simpson believes to be unethical behavior in the high country, such as callousness
toward others' suffering and death, and the general ebb of inherent mountaineer morality).
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Self reliance, independence, a sense of freedom in a clean and
beautiful environment-these are what keep alive a love for the
mountains. At one time rescue was seen almost as something
shameful. Difficulties had to be overcome by one's own efforts.
Too often nowadays it seems that if you get a little tired, or
sustain a minor but discomforting injury, all you need to do is
get out your mobile phone and call up the rescue teams.74
Further, Simpson believes that this physical and mental laziness destroys
the kinship and intimacy that used to develop across individuals and cul-
tures in the context of striving together against "death. and distress."
Nietzsche purportedly observed that "a few hours of mountain climbing
turn a villain and a saint into two rather equal creatures. Exhaustion is
the shortest way to equality and fraternity-and liberty is added eventu-
ally by sleep. 75
Simpson's narrations from the mountaineering front indicate that
commercialization has eroded the equalizing function of the sport:
These clients of trekking companies are not mountaineers; they
have served no apprenticeship in the hills, have learned nothing
of the ethos of behaviour that governs any true mountain lover.
Many of them show no respect for the mountains, nor for the
people who struggle to live among them. For some the mountain
arena has become no more than a glorified theme park from
which they can buy their exit whenever they wish .... 76
Or, to put Simpson's observations in the vocabulary of the tourism an-
thropologists, rather than reconnecting with pre-modern "structures of
wholeness," the mountaineer consumers are importing their fractured,
atomistic culture with them, thereby re-creating everything they seek to
escape wherever they go. Moreover, in the absence of rigorous protective
policies and regulations, these eco-pilgrims put environmentally sensitive
regions at risk by virtue of their numbers and their consumptive modes of
travel.
One might respond that Everest and its environs-the trekking and
mountaineering frenzy in the Himalayas-are too hyperbolic to represent
a general change in the culture of backpacking, climbing, and mountain-
eering. Perhaps one should read the texts of the participants, such as
Simpson, Krakauer, and Breashears, with at least a grain of skepticism.
Are they just like every aging veteran, romanticizing the past and warn-
74 1d. at 89.
75 DAVID A. FENNELL, EcOTOURISM: AN INTRODUCTION 48 (1999) (attributing the
quotation to Nietzsche).
76 SIMPSON, supra note 33, at 114-15.
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ing the youngsters that it will never be for them what it was in the hal-
cyon days? Perhaps there is a bit of this, but while the Everest phenome-
non is extreme, it is not unrepresentative. Nor are old-school mountain-
eers the only ones commenting on the changes.
B. Beyond Everest: Recreation as Conquest and Exploitation
According to a wide variety of recent studies, outdoor recreation is
on the rise in American society." Hiking is the most common "outdoor
adventure activity," with the most number of participants per year.7" The
other forms of potentially reflective recreation have also gained in popu-
larity. Technical rock climbing has burgeoned. 79 The number of people
engaging in "primitive area camping" grew by almost sixty percent from
1982-83 to 1994-95.8" Of particular relevance to the idea of outdoor rec-
reation as a means of cultivating the self, participation in "wilderness
experience programs" has also grown."1 These programs, the best known
of which are Outward Bound and the National Outdoor Leadership School
("NOLS"), have varying approaches and philosophies.8 2 Some emphasize
personal growth in the face of adversity.8 3 Some stress the connection to
nature and attempt to foster affinity for wilderness preservation.84 Their
overall success can be fairly credited, however, to the idea of wilderness
as a "restorative environment."85
Yet in all of these contexts, the reflective recreation justification faces
challenges. The challenges come in different forms. One form is the
transference of goal-oriented, competitive, un-zen like behavior into set-
17 See generally OUTDOOR RECREATION, supra note 1 (containing various case studies
documenting trends in outdoor recreation).
71 H. Ken Cordell et al., Outdoor Recreation Participation Trends, in OUTDOOR REC-
REATION, supra note 1, at 239 (noting that during 1994-95, about 48 million people 16
years or older went hiking; 15 million of these backpacked).
79 See Sally Moser & Sam Davidson, Technical Rock Climbing Trends in the U.S., in
OUTDOOR RECREATION, supra note 1, at 312-13 (noting that as of 1996, there were 300,000-
400,000 "active" climbers, a three- to fourfold increase over the figure a decade ago).
80 Cordell, supra note 78, at 239.
81 Gregory T. Friese et al., History and Status of Use of Wilderness for Personal
Growth, in OUTDOOR RECREATION, supra note 1, at 380 (stating that participation is in-
creasing at the rate of fifteen percent per year).
82 See id. at 380-83 (discussing the range of approaches and proposing a continuum of
methods from "Wilderness is Teacher" to "Wilderness is Classroom").
83 See id.; see also About Outward Bound, at http://www.outwardbound.comaboutob.
html (last visited Feb. 21, 2003) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
Outward Bound promotes personal growth through outdoor experiences. The school em-
phasizes that individuals can develop tenacity, teamwork, skills, self-reliance, and leader-
ship through its outdoor programs.
14See Friese et al., supra note 81, at 380-83; see also National Outdoor Leadership
School, at http://www.nols.edu (last visited Apr. 18, 2003). Like Outward Bound, NOLS
emphasizes leadership training and personal growth, but also stresses that it is educating
students to be wilderness advocates.
85 See Friese et al., supra note 81, at 381.
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tings that Sax described as ideal for overcoming such tendencies. An-
other is that commercial ventures and advances in recreation technology
have the potential to substitute passivity, and even mindlessness, for reflec-
tion. A third form is the intentional co-opting of the psychological benefits
of reflective recreation for competitive advantage in the business world.
1. If It's Tuesday, This Must Be the Appalachian Trail
The first form of challenge to the Sax ideal-transforming reflective
recreation into goal-driven activity-is evident in the Everest context. Of
course, the possibility that nature activities will mutate from reflective to
goal-driven has always existed. Sax does not claim that climbing, hiking,
and backpacking inevitably generate reflection and-contemplation, merely
that they have all of the crucial ingredients to do so.86 As Everest indi-
cates, however, it is becoming more commonplace for those ingredients
to yield a different stew. Less extravagant activities have likewise been
transformed into seemingly conventional, goal-driven quests, at a pace
and on a scale not in existence two decades ago.
For example, "speed records" appear to be the latest craze in the be-
nign sport of backpacking. In the fall of 2001, Brian Robinson "scam-
pered" up Mount Katahdin in Maine to complete "the longest, fastest walk
in American history."87 Mr. Robinson succeeded in being the first person
to hike America's three national scenic trails, the Appalachian, the Pacific
Crest, and the Continental Divide, in less than a year.88 The description of
his trip hardly stirs or elevates the soul. The notion of hiking-as-contemp-
lative is turned on its head by the motivation ascribed to Mr. Robinson in
his final miles: "The climb did not interest him. It certainly did not chal-
lenge him. The top was all he cared about."89 As opposed to achieving a
Zen-like state of awareness, Mr. Robinson became estranged from many
normal emotions and sensations: "Hiking is a very social experience....
This time around I am missing it. I'm moving too fast."90 Even eating-
one of the singular pleasures of backpacking-became mechanistic: "I
eat food .... I don't taste it."9'
Mr. Robinson is not alone in striving to be the fastest hiker. In the
fall of 1999, Andrew Hamilton set a speed record for climbing all fifty-
four of Colorado's peaks more than 14,000 feet high. 92 Hamilton com-
pleted his feat in 13 days, 22 hours, 48 minutes. His comments, like
86 See SAX, supra note 7, at 27-46.
87 Blaine Harden, For a Speed Hiker Three Trails End in Maine and a Record, N.Y





92 Nadia White, Boulderite Climbed 54 Peaks in 13 Days, BOULDER DAILY CAMERA,
Sept. 12, 1999, at BI.
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those of Mr. Robinson, fail to inspire a sense of intimacy with nature. "'I
think I've been looking forward to being done since the day I started,"'
he is quoted as saying.93 Certainly, Hamilton pushed himself to the limits
of physical capacity. He climbed down many mountains backwards due
to a sore knee. He made roughly a quarter of his ascents in the dark. He
got lost, slept very little, and spent one wet, cold night wrapped in a space
blanket at 13,000 feet.94 Yet achieving a goal, not transcending it, was the
sole focus of this masochistic endeavor.
Even such remote environs as Antarctica have become proving grounds
for those with uncontainable competitive urges. On January 22, 2002,
five runners gathered at a starting line 26.2 miles from the South Pole for
a race.95 The South Pole Marathon, sponsored by Adventura Network
International, a Florida-based company, took place in conditions so difficult
that the initial start was delayed by two days. 96 Two of the five runners
decided to downgrade their effort to a half-marathon. 97 The other three
persisted in going the entire distance, despite daily high temperatures of
only thirteen degrees below zero and visibility hampered by thick fog.98
The frigid and exhausting race failed to generate a contemplative mood
among the three who went the marathon distance; two of the competitors
are in a bitter fight over whether one or the other of them abandoned an
agreement to run together. The post-race fighting became so acrimonious
that each has launched legal threats against the other and one implied that
the other was an international terrorist. 99
One might be tempted to dismiss such stories as unrepresentative anec-
dotes, but long-time participants in mountaineering, hiking, rock climb-
ing, and other similar activities report widespread levels of non-reflective
competitiveness. 100 Rock climbing, which once was the province of slightly
offbeat, counter-cultural loners, now claims more than 7 million partici-
pants. ' Climbing gyms available in urban areas fuel the sport's popular-
ity. 102 One veteran climber believes that learning to climb in a gym has a
93 Id.
94 Id. at B4.
91 Austin Murphy, South Pole Marathon, SI ADVENTURE, Apr. 29, 2002, available at
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/features/siadventure/14/south-pole/index.html (last visited





101 See generally SIMPSON, supra note 33.
101 KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, State of the Industry Report, 1997: Rock Climbing High-
lights, at http://www.outdoorindustry.org/market-research-articles/97soi/rockdata.html (last
visited Mar. 16, 2002) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
102 One climbing gym site reports that "sport climbing and indoor climbing have be-
come a pursuit unto themselves." Types of Climbing, at http://www.verticallyinclined.com/
TypesOfClimbing.html (last visited May 16, 2002) (on file with the Harvard Environmental
Law Review). The same Web site states that while there were no climbing gyms in North
America in the early 1980s, there are now over 350 to 400. Id. The Outdoor Industry Asso-
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distinct effect on the ethics of those who are now flooding the sport. 103
They do not approach it as if it were an outdoor activity. Rather, it is a
means of exercise and fitness that they happen to be doing outdoors. For
many gym-trained climbers, their interest in climbing has nothing to do
with a desire to be in nature. 104 Therefore, when conflicts arise between
their desired use of an outdoor resource and some other interest, they do
not necessarily gravitate toward an environmentally sensitive solution.0 5
2. Commercializing Reflection: A Contradiction in Terms
Rock climbing's popularity, like that of mountaineering, has also
been reinforced and fed upon by commercial climbing outfitters. The
commercialization of climbing has contributed to the second challenge to
the Sax ideal described above-the transformation from a reflective ac-
tivity to a mindless one."° Many of the guided tours enable rock climbers-
with minimal skills to ascend difficult and obscure routes. As with the
gym-trained climbers, many (though not all) of these paying customers
have not undergone the initiation that old school climbers have. 07 Moreover,
the commercial outfits themselves alter the incentives of the sport. They
are in it to make a living, and therefore may be unwilling to bend in the
face of detriment to environmental or cultural concerns.
One such commercial outfitter challenged the National Park Serv-
ice's implementation of a voluntary, one-month ban on climbing Devil's
Tower in Wyoming, arguing that this mild accommodation to American
ciation similarly claims that "indoor climbing has taken off as more and more specialized
facilities are being built around the country." KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, State of the In-
dustry Report, 1997: Markets to Watch, at http://www.outdoorindustry.org/market-
research-articles/97soi/ markets.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2003). They also report that an
industry-sponsored Climbing Gym Association grew from 89 gyms in 1994 to over 200 in
1997. Id.; see also Keith Goetzman, The Late, Great Outdoors, UTNE READER, Sept. 2001,
at 16 (describing boom in artificial environments for outdoor sports, including climbing,
kayaking, snow-boarding and surfing).
103 Interview with Adam Massey in Boulder, Colo. (Oct. 31, 2001) (notes on file with
the Harvard Environmental Law Review). Massey, a Boulder resident, was once nationally
recognized as one of the best climbers in the sub-set of the sport know as "bouldering,"
which involves free soloing (climbing without protection) difficult rock problems without
gaining much altitude.
104 See Goetzman, supra note 102, at 16.
'01 Interview with Adam Massey, supra note 103. Massey described conflicts among
climbers at popular bouldering and top-roping sites in Boulder concerning trash clean up
and environmental sensitivity of the location. Id.; see also Chris Barge, Plan May Crimp
Climbers: Officials Say Days of Rampant Trail Use Are Coming to a Close, BOULDER
DAILY CAMERA, Apr. 7, 2002, at Al (discussing conflicts between environmental manage-
ment for habitat and species protection and informal trail use by rock climbers).
'0 This is distinguishable from threats posed by transforming a reflective activity into
a goal-oriented one. In this case, even if the commercialized nature activities are not ex-
plicitly about achieving a literal or figurative summit, commercialization nonetheless robs
them of the reflective qualities that Sax describes.
'01 See Interview with Peter Nichols, supra note 68.
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Indian religious practices violated the Establishment Clause.1"8 The Ameri-
can Indian tribes desiring this accommodation, which would have al-
lowed them to engage in annual ceremonies on a site that they hold sa-
cred, practice religions that center around nature. In these religions, all
natural entities-animals, plants, trees-are material manifestations of a
spirituality that permeates the earth. 1°9 Native religions such as these are
the direct and indirect inspiration for many recent efforts to articulate an
ethic of environmental protection." 0 Therefore, it is ironic that a faction
of the new outdoor enthusiasts would align themselves directly against a
minimal adaptation to these religious practices.
.According to Sax's ideal, rock climbing and mountaineering allow
us to pass through the Rubicon of wilderness to emerge as better people.
Yet the commercialization of these activities has meant that for many,
their fundamental meaning has little to do either with connections to na-
ture or with moral improvement. This observation, like those concerning
the transformations wrought by commercial mountaineering on Everest,
do not necessarily impugn the motives of many who turn to climbing gyms,
guides, and commercial trips. Indeed, many may well be looking, at
some level, for something beyond what most such experiences can offer.
A subset of this second challenge to the Sax ideal is the unabashed
marketing of products based on their ability to convey the sense of "get-
ting away from it all," even while the products themselves undermine
aspects of environmental goals. The SUV is a prime example. A Ford Ex-
plorer magazine advertisement reads:
Tom and Sally worked hard to get where they are. But now that
they've "arrived," all they want to do is get the heck out. So, last
weekend, they traded business talk for a babbling brook and
108 See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448 (D. Wyo. 1998)
(rejecting climbers' Establishment Clause challenge), aff'd on other grounds, 175 F.3d 814
(10th Cir. 1999) (finding that the climbers lacked standing to challenge the voluntary ban
because they had not been injured by its implementation).
109 See Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-Determination:
The Role of Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological Knowledge, 21 VT. L. REV.
225, 272-87 (1996) (describing central tenets of Native American religions). See generally
VINE DELORIA, JR., GOD is RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION (2d ed. 1992) (summariz-
ing Native American religious outlooks and contrasting them with those of the Judeo-
Christian tradition). Providing an apt summary of the structure of Native religions, Profes-
sor Deloria states that "[a]t the deepest philosophical level our universe must have as a
structure a set of relationships in which all entities participate. Within the physical world
this universal structure can best be understood as a recognition of the sacredness of
places." Id. at 1-2.
" See, e.g., Annie L. Booth & Harvey M. Jacobs, ies that Bind: Native American Beliefs
as Foundation for Environmental Consciousness, in ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: DIVER-
GENCE AND CONVERGENCE 256 (Richard G. Botzler & Susan J. Armstrong eds., 2d ed.
1998) (noting that many mainstream and radical environmental groups draw inspiration
from Native American views, but that many of these groups also lack a sophisticated un-
derstanding of Native cultures and belief systems).
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conference calls for conifer pines. They aimed their new Ford
Explorer Sport toward the country, took turns driving, and sang
out loud whenever they felt the urge: "Bye-bye blacktop."1"'
An ad for a Chevy Tahoe with OnStar security asks: "How far would you
wander if you knew someone was always there if you needed help?"" 2
The Suzuki Grand Vitara promises: "Outside: 155 horses running wild.
Inside: The only sound is the padded steering wheel sliding through your
fingertips.""' 3 And Isuzu advertisement presents a collage of photos includ-
ing its Trooper perched on red sandstone bluffs, a rock climber ascending
a crack, and a spire in Monument Valley, and announces: "Life is too big
for cars."'1 4 This list could go on for thousands of pages. Just take a look at
almost any SUV ad-the Big Nature backdrop, and the subtle or overt
promise to turn you into a weekend version of Sir Edmund Hilary.
Of course, the automotive -industry is not shooting in the dark here.
Chrysler "hired a team of anthropologists to define the appeal of the Jeep
for a marketing campaign."" 5 The anthropologists concluded that people
buy SUVs to associate themselves with nature and to create images of
themselves as adventurers.1 16 The SUV manufacturers signal to the buyer
that an extremely large automobile will strengthen her connection to the
wilderness. 17 To the extent one can attribute sales increases to marketing,
the strategy has been wildly successful; while sales of passenger cars
have decreased slightly since 1980, the number of light trucks sold has
more than tripled.' SUV sales account for most of this change, rising
from 200,000 in 1975 to nearly three million in 1999. 19 At the same time,
the auto industry has lobbied heavily to ensure that gas-hungry SUVs
evade the stricter emissions and efficiency standards that apply to cars.120
"'OUTSIDE MAGAZINE, Dec. 1998, at 124 (on file with the Harvard Environmental
Law Review).
112 Id. at 125 (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
"' SKI, Dec. 1998 (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
114 Id.
"I LESLEY HAZLETON, DRIVING TO DETROIT 70-71 (1998).
116 Id.
117 ld.
"' Brent D. Yacobucci, Congressional Research Service (CRS), Code No. RS20298,
Sport Utility Vehicles, Mini-Vans and Light Trucks: An Overview of Fuel Economy and
Emissions Standards (Jan. 16, 2001), available at http://cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/Air/air-
32.cfm (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
119 See Kyler Smart, Losing Ground: How SUVs Are Making the United States Less
Fuel-Efficient and Options for Reversing the Downward Trend, 7 ENVTL. LAW. 159, 160
(2000) (citing Office of Mobile Sources (OMS), EPA, No. 420-S-99-003, Light-Duty
Automotive Technology and Fuel Economy Trends Through 1999, at 3).
120 See Laura Cohn, Congress Is Giving Carmakers a Free Ride, BUSINESSWEEK ON-
LINE (Mar. 15, 2002), at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/mar2002/
nf20020315_7764.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2003) (on file with the Harvard Environmental
Law Review) (describing auto industry's long history of lobbying Congress not to enact
fuel efficiency standards, and most recently the "intense lobbying effort" to persuade
senators not to pass increased efficiency standards but rather to defer to the industry-
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The corporate average fuel efficiency standard, or "CAFE standard," for
SUVs is 20.7 miles per gallon ("mpg"), whereas the standard for cars is
27.5.121 If all SUVs were compelled to meet even the relatively undemand-
ing standard of 27.5 mpg, roughly one million barrels of oil could be
conserved daily. 2 Given the myriad battles at present concerning oil and
gas drilling on our public lands, the irony of using our hunger for nature
to sell us these nature-consuming vehicles cannot be understated. Fur-
thermore, it turns out that Tom and Sally rarely leave the blacktop be-
hind. One poll showed that only thirteen percent of the owners of a Ford-
model SUV ever leave the pavement. I13 Tom and Sally buy the SUV but
never actually fulfill their anthropologically documented dreams of con-
necting with nature. And oil consumption rises, threatening many of the
very places used as picturesque backdrops to market SUVs.lZ4
3. The Wilderness School of Business Administration
The wilderness has also been seized upon as a terrific place to sharpen
one's business acumen. A new breed of outdoor adventure schools has
arisen using nature as the classroom in which to develop skills for the
boardroom. The third challenge to the reflective recreation justification is
the co-opting of the psychological benefits of outdoor recreation for com-
petitive business advantage. This is a perverse tribute to the notion that
engagement with the natural world enhances one's senses and makes one
live more fully. Instead of taking nature's lessons out into the world in a
way that benefits nature, these schools use nature and wilderness as an
instrumental backdrop to advance entirely unrelated (and potentially
contradictory) agendas.
One such entity is the John Ridgeway School of Adventure, where
executives and other managerial-level employees attend camps aimed at
promoting courage, strength, self-confidence, and team playing.'25 The
Ridgeway activities take place in distinctly harsh, cold, and unpleasant
friendly Department of Transportation).
"I See Yacobucci, supra note 118 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 533 (2001)).
122 See Robert Bamberger, Congressional Research Service (CRS), Code No. IB90122,
Automobile and Light Truck Fuel Economy: Is CAFE Up to Standards? (Aug. 3, 2001),
available at http://cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/Air/air-10.cfm (on file with the Harvard Envi-
ronmental Law Review).
123 See Yacobucci, supra note 118 (citing Ford Motor Company, as cited in Harper's
Index, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, May 1998, at 15).
124 Many SUV ads are filmed in and around the northern Arizona and southern Utah
canyon country. Some of the most intense recent battles over drilling for oil and gas on
public lands have taken place in these regions. See, e.g., Enviros Seek to Halt Utah Gas,
Oil Drilling, GAS DAILY, July 12, 2002, at 3 (describing environmental challenges to the
Bureau of Land Management's decision to lease seventeen parcels of land for oil and gas
drilling in southeastern Utah), available at 2002 WL 17768458.
125 Manfred F. R. Kets de Vries, John Ridgeway's School of Adventure, in FRONTIERS
OF LEADERSHIP 462, 462 (Michel Syrett & Clare Hogg eds., 1992).
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outdoor conditions. In Ridgeway's so-called "IBM Course," for example,
"[c]ourse participants are put through a series of disorienting and isolat-
ing activities while at the same time being given punishing outdoor as-
signments to complete. Sleep and food are in short supply and instructors
are deliberately noncommunicative or obstructive, setting unexpected 'sur-
prise' targets."' 2 6 Despite the anxieties it inspires in corporate executives,
the Ridgeway program has been viewed as a success, and Ridgeway has
run courses for companies including IBM, British Telecom, SEC,
Plessey, and Bass.'27
Outdoor Travel Adventures ("OTA"), a similar program, begs people
to "let [OTA] organize your next training session or executive incentive.' 2
OTA offers programs that include climbing, whitewater rafting, wilder-
ness first aid, sea kayaking, orienteering, and backpacking, and that "re-
quire you to work as a team and take your level of interaction and sup-
port to a higher place."'129 OTA further boasts that "if your corporate ob-
jective is to develop strong team players and risk takers then our pro-
grams are for you."'30
The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania has also
bought into the idea that "[m]ountaineering provides a natural metaphor
for business . . . ."I" The venerable business school arranged a two-week
"Leadership Trek to Mount Everest" for recent graduates of the School's
executive master of business administration degree program.'3 2 As one of
the participants described it, "the mission ... was to confront the idea of
summits: why and how-and if-we want to take ourselves and others to
the top."'33 Their reading list along the way included many mountaineer-
ing classics, including Krakauer's Into Thin Air.' The course partici-
pants mapped trendy management-speak onto their experiences in the
Himalayas: their Sherpa guide was excellent at "managing divergent in-
terests;" the class members had to determine how to "allow everyone to
achieve their own personal goal[s]."'135 The jagged peaks and rocky paths
proved to be ideal training ground for these future business leaders. As an
executive with Deutsche Bank concluded, "Next time I face a difficulty, in
126 Id. at 462-63.
127 Id. at 463.
128 Outdoor Travel Adventures, Team Building: Experience the Ultimate in a Team
Building Program, at http://www.otadventures.com/asp/teambuilding.asp (last visited Feb.
19, 2003) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
129 Id.
130 Id.
"s' See Andrea Useem & Michael Useem, Himalayan Diary: A Trek from M.B.A. to
Mountaintop: Lessons in Leadership Improve One's View, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Dec.
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my office or anywhere, I will remember this and say 'I made it up there, I
can do it again."'136
These Dale-Carnegie-cum-John-Muir courses exemplify an intrigu-
ing aspect of the consuming wilderness phenomenon. Sax and his secular
prophets were perhaps too correct in their assessment of natural settings
as ideal learning environments. Inherent in Sax's view is that the reflective
activities should be valued for their own sake, and we should take away
lessons about ourselves, but also about our relationship to the land, and
our consequent duty to protect it. Indeed, the last several chapters of
Sax's book provide explicit policy advice to government officials con-
cerning how to manage our public lands.'37 The how-to-succeed-in-business
wilderness schools, however, merely use wilderness as a backdrop for
achieving another set of objectives. It does not take much imagination to
conjure up some perverse scenarios. For example, a group of oil com-
pany executives hones business skills in the very settings they hope to
open up for leasing, or a cohort of managers employed by a corporate
hog farm relies on back-country sharpened tactics to fight local regula-
tors about water quality.
C. In Search of Extremes in an Age of Explornography
Many wilderness experiences appear to have been "tamed" as a re-
sult of the phenomena discussed in the preceding Parts. To achieve dis-
tance from the pressures of conventional life, it may appear to be neces-
sary to go farther and farther afield. But if there are already corporate-
sponsored marathons in Antarctica, where can one go? One response is to
concoct increasingly extreme experiences. Another is to question the ap-
proach of seeking engagement through means that entail escalation of
extremity.
1. The Search for Suffering and the Gear To Do It in Style
A recent arrival on the adventure travel scene is the "recreate the
miserable experiences of an explorer" guided trip. These tours lead ur-
banites down the trails of well known historical expeditions, often failed
ones. Journalist John Tierney, a self-described "New Yorker who hate[s]
camping" has dubbed this phenomenon "explornography."' 38 With supe-
rior technology, ordinary folk can retrace the icy steps of Ernest Shack-
leton, Robert Peary, and other ill-fated explorers without any of the origi-
nal risk. 139 On Tierney's trip, a group of mostly forty- and fifty-something
136 Useem & Useem, supra note 131.
'
37 See SAX, supra note 7, at 79-101.
3' John Tierney, Going Where A Lot of Dudes With Really Great Equipment Have
Gone Before, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 26, 1998, at 18, 20.
139 Id. at 20.
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"desk jockeys" set out to ski and sled their way across Ellesmere, Can-
ada's northernmost island. Their destination was the coast where Peary
and others "experienced what was probably the highest misery-per-visitor
ratio of any place on earth."' 4 While all of the modem-day travelers felt
some discomfort, none even approached the gruesome experiences of
Peary and the other nineteenth-century explorers who ended up at "star-
vation camp." Tierney begins his article by quoting a passage from the
memoirs of one of Peary's crewmembers, who describes pulling off one of
Peary's boots, only to find several of Peary's toes stuck to the undershoes.' 41
Tierney's piece is largely a humorous travelogue, but he spends a
fair amount of space pondering the explornography boom and its mean-
ings. He speculates about motivations, and at one point confesses:
Even I, who dreaded the prospect of an Arctic trek, loved shop-
ping for it .... I happily spent hours in ... gearhead bazaars
fondling smooth layers of Capilene and Polartec, agonizing
between Gore-Tex and Supplex, picking out gloves and gaunt-
lets, glacier sunglasses and a chronometer with a built in ther-
mometer, barometer and altimeter that I absolutely had to have.
As I walked across Central Park in April to train on a cross-
country ski machine at my gym, I exulted in my monstrous new
leather-and-rubber LaCrosse pack boots guaranteed to 100 de-
grees below zero. How manly! Take that, Nature! Just to be
safe, I also bought a pair of Steger Mukluks for $135.142
To state the obvious, at one level Tierney's motivation is all about the
gear, or at least the shopping for it. In this he is not alone. Outdoor rec-
reation equipment is a fast-growing sector of the retail market.'43 REI,
once a cooperative outdoor gear store that drew 1970s-era cut-off cordu-
roy clad hikers and backpackers from Berkeley and Seattle, now has a
nationwide presence, with 63 stores in 24 states.'" The stores range in
size from 10,000 to 95,000 square feet, and have features such as climb-
ing pinnacles, bike test trails, and camp stove demonstration tables. 45
Many who would like to heed the advice of Sax's secular prophets make
it at least as far as the retail gear stores, whether or not they make it any
140Id. at 18, 21.
41 Id. at 18.
142 Id. at 22.
143 See KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, State of the Industry Report, 1997: Executive Sum-
mary, at http://www.outdoorindustry.org/market-research-articles/97soi/exec summary.
html (last visited Apr. 22, 2003) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review) ("A
current snapshot of the outdoor industry reveals increasing sales, new activities, and
growth in participation... ").
144 See REI, About REI, at http://www.rei.com/aboutrei/about-rei.html?stat=side_30
(last visited Feb. 19, 2003) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
'I See id.
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further. 146 One thirty-one-year-old climber and real estate agent in Man-
hattan, who has spent about $10,000 on equipment, reports that gear is
"about fifty percent of your climb." 147 As with paid guides, there are le-
gitimate concerns that gear makes it possible for those without experi-
ence to get just far enough to land in considerable trouble in the wilds.1 41
A true believer in the free market would respond that the gear stores
are simply responding to consumer demand. So the question remains-
what is it about the activities in which this gear allows us to engage,
whether prepared to do so or not, that is so compelling? Even Tierney
starts to sound like John Muir, albeit a bemused and ironic Muir, on this
topic. It is about the incomparable feeling of breaking trail on pristine
ground, having earned the right to do so with sprained thumbs and black
toenails. 149 Tierney recounts the following conversation with one of his
travel-mates: "'You know why I do this? At this moment I feel alive!'
Part of me thought he looked ridiculous-he was an even worse skier
than I-and part of me knew exactly how he felt.""15 Even explornogra-
phy addicts yearn for the benefits of reflective recreation, whether they
want to admit it or not. The extremity and absurdity of adventures such
as Tierney's, however, simultaneously threaten a certain aspect of the Sax
ideal. As noted above, Sax's identification of activities and locales that
have the potential to offer Us reflective recreation was grounded in a par-
ticular domestic agenda concerning uses of our public lands.'51 In the
days of Sax's intellectual forbears like Thoreau, Emerson, and Muir, 152
the wilds of the United States offered more such places and opportunities
than one needed in a lifetime. Today, through a combination of over-
crowding, over-mapping, and overly limited imaginations, adventure travel-
ers such as Tierney have the perception that there are no mysteries left on
the globe.'53 Therefore although they would like to follow the secular
prophets, they do not think they will find what they seek if those prophets
are struggling down anything other than the most extreme, most far away,
most forbidding trails. In this way, the quest for engagement grows closer
146 See KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, supra note 143 (noting that 1996 retail sales were
estimated at $4.7 billion, up $400 million from 1995, and that hiking footwear and outer-
wear were the major growth areas for retailers).
147 Ian Fisher, Gear: A Costly Affliction With No Known Cure, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,
1998, at G3.
141 Id. (noting that many outdoor devotees voice the concern that "gear has improved
so much that it can, paradoxically, make some sports more dangerous. For all the ad-
vancements in ropes-stretch, harnesses, and anchors-some mountain climbers say that
beginners often think the risk in a climb is erased by the quality of their equipment.").
149 See Tierney, supra note 138, at 37.
15 0 Id.
11 See SAX, supra note 7, at 61-101, 111-13 (making suggestions concerning man-
agement of national parks and offering "[a] Policy Statement: The Meaning of National
Parks Today").
52 See infra Part IV.A.
153 Tierney, supra note 138, at 20.
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to the kind of thrill seeking that motorized recreation offers.'- Of course,
the Everest phenomenon demonstrates this tendency as well. Moreover,
the consumption, in terms of the market for gear, the fuel for travel, and
the transformation of remote places into tourist destinations, becomes an
end in itself and has serious potential for adverse environmental impacts.155
2. Getting Away from It All: The Trouble with the Explorer Metaphor
Two final non-commercialized outdoor adventure tales further high-
light the problem of the perceived need to up the ante in terms of ex-
tremity in an age of commodified experiences. More importantly, these
stories illuminate a problem that lies at the core of the reflective recrea-
tion justification itself. Both stories involve young men who sought to expe-
rience life outside the boundaries of ordinary societal constraints. Both
young men therefore ventured to places they deemed to be wild, in that
they contained unsurpassed beauty as well as vast territory in which to
roam. Each shed many of the comforts and conveniences of the day in
order to chart a path requiring engagement, choice, and self-reliance.
Both seem, therefore, to be prototypes of the Sax ideal.
Yet their differences reveal the dramatic ways in which technology
and development have changed our relationship to the wild, even within
the last several decades. The changes compel some to seek greater dis-
tance from human society and culture, whether through increasingly ex-
travagant commodified adventures, as discussed above, or through hyper-
bolic solo jaunts, as discussed below. Another response, however, is to
question the premise that we have to, or even can, escape human culture
and society, in order to seek communion with non-human nature. The
escapist model at the heart of Sax's justification creates a threshold dis-
tinction between humans and nature that leads to the sorts of quests that,
tragically, both defeat the Saxian contemplative ideal and reinforce anti-
ecological behavior.
Everett Ruess was a young artist and romantic from northern Cali-
fornia who traveled by himself throughout the canyon country of north-
ern Arizona and southern Utah in the early 1930s. 56 When he was only
twenty, Ruess disappeared, leaving few clues as to his fate. His two bur-
ros were found in Davis Gulch, a side canyon to the Escalante River, but
no one has ever confirmed whether he died there or elsewhere. Some
" See SAX, supra note 7, at 34-35 (describing dirt-biking and snowmobiling while
commenting that "[tihe picture here is all exhilaration and excitement-speed, danger, and
domination.").
155 See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text (describing environmental impacts
on Everest); see also infra Part III.D (discussing environmental impacts of unrestrained
"ecotourism").
'
56 See generally W. L. RuSHo, EVERETT RUESS: A VAGABOND FOR BEAUTY (1983)
(providing biographical details of Ruess's life, as well as a compilation of Ruess's letters
to family and friends from his travels).
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speculate that he fled to lead a free and anonymous life as a perpetual
drifter-a life that would require of him neither allegiance nor obligation
to anyone.157 Another theory is that he had a Navajo sweetheart, and he
disappeared to live quietly among his adopted people.'58 Still others deem
it more likely that he was murdered.159 The most sober assessment of his
disappearance is that he was swept downriver while attempting to cross
the Colorado.
Ruess chronicled his wanderings in his letters home to friends and
family, as well as in journal entries and poetry. His writings speak viscer-
ally to anyone who has felt similarly consumed by the harsh, delicate
beauty of the desert:
You could not guess in what a fantastic place I am. I sit in the
shade of an ancient, dying Juniper tree, cushioned on my Navajo
saddle blankets. On all sides, the burning sun beats down on si-
lent, empty desert. To right and left, long walls of sandstone
mesas reach away into the distance, the shadows in their fluted
clefts the color of claret. Before me, the desert drops sheer away
into a vast valley, in which strangely eroded buttes of all deli-
cate and intense shadings of vermilion, orange and purple, tower
into a cloudless turquoise sky. 6°
Sometimes, his prose borders on self-important or maudlin: "Once more
I am roaring drunk with the lust of life and adventure and unbearable
beauty .... Always I'll be able to scorn the worlds I've known like half-
burnt candles when the sun is rising, and sally forth to others now un-
known. '1 6' Yet it is somehow all the more captivating for its high-volume
sincerity. His rapt descriptions of his surroundings, as well as the mys-
tery of his death, have made Ruess into somewhat of a folk hero, or at
least a revered spirit, among desert wilderness activists. The Southern
Utah Wilderness Alliance, a grassroots group dedicated to preserving
Utah's unique desert environments, has an image of Ruess and his two
burros as its logo. 62
Like Ruess before him, Christopher McCandless sought to free him-
self of the constraints of conventional society by taking up a life of vaga-
bond adventure travel. Upon graduating from college in May of 1990,
' See id. at 199-206 (recounting efforts by the Ruess family to determine Everett's
whereabouts, including tracking down reports that he was spotted in places as distant as
Mexico).
158 See id. at 208-09, 212.
159 Id. at 205-06 (reporting stories of an alleged confession of Ruess's murder by a
Navajo man jailed on other charges).
160Id. at 156-57.
161 RuSHO, supra note 156, at 145.
162 See Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, Everett Ruess, at http://suwa.org/everett.
html (last visited Feb. 19, 2003) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
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McCandless divested himself of all of his material possessions, gave his
savings to OXFAM America, and disappeared into the recesses of the
road. 163 Like Ruess, McCandless was in his early twenties and appeared
to have a similar idealism bordering on dogmatism concerning how to
live life to its fullest. And, like Ruess, McCandless died in the midst of
his travels, leaving his relatives and the rest of us to ponder the meaning
of his short life and its abrupt end. Unlike Ruess, however, McCandless
is neither lionized nor romanticized. McCandless quotations do not adorn
the Web sites of wilderness preservation groups. Indeed, his death-of
starvation in the Alaskan outback-was ridiculed by many who viewed
him as a naive, silly youth who lacked the skills necessary to survive in
the last great American wilderness."6
Why the differing views of these two men, who appear to have so
much in common? Jon Krakauer explores this question in Into the Wild,
his compelling narrative of McCandless's life. 165 One easy answer is that
time softens the meanness with which we view eccentricity-lunatics from
the present always appear crazier than do lunatics from the past. Another
is that the two young men differ enough in their details to justify the dif-
ferent views. Ruess was a wanderer, but he wrote to his family and ap-
peared to be impressively resourceful, self-sufficient, and wily concern-
ing how to survive in his chosen wild milieus.' 66 McCandless, on the
other hand, terminated all communication with his family in an appar-
ently cruel and hurtful way. 167 Further, the details of his death, until plumbed
convincingly by Krakauer, appeared to support the thesis that McCan-
dless was an unskilled, foolish wilderness traveler. Hunters found McCan-
dless's emaciated corpse inside a rusted out bus that was not too far from
an easy way out of the wilderness. 61 McCandless failed to find the exit,
which consisted of a cable crossing over a seasonal river, because he did
not have a topographical map. 6 9
Krakauer, however, makes the case that McCandless was a Ruess for
the 1990s. It is much harder to escape from the mainstream than it was
sixty years ago. Ruess was traveling extensively throughout the Navajo
reservation and its surroundings, which white men barely knew. Recall,
for instance, that vast stretches of Arizona and Utah were literally un-
mapped by white people until 1869, when John Wesley Powell took his
famous harrowing trip down the Colorado River through the Grand Can-
163 See JON KRAKAUER, INTO THE WILD 20 (1996).
'14 See id. at 177-78 (referring to letters lambasting McCandless as "stupid," "incom-
petent," and "pathetic").
165 Id.
166 See RuSHO, supra note 156, at 9-181 (reproducing Ruess's letters to family and
friends from throughout his travels).
167 See KRAKAUER, supra note 163, at 103-04, 125-26.
168 Id. at 12-13.
169 Id. at 173-74.
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yon. 170 When Ruess journeyed through Navajoland with his burros and
scruffy dog, he was likely one of the first non-Indians whom many Na-
vajo had ever seen. No cellphones, Burger Kings, or satellite dishes could
connect Ruess comfortably to life in Los Angeles. Thus, when Ruess wan-
dered in the labyrinths of red sandstone within this stronghold of Native
American life, he was not just in a desert wilderness, but one within a
foreign land.
By the time McCandless set out on his vision quest, seventy years of
consumer capitalism and technological advancement had shrunk the dis-
tance between the most remote slot canyon in Utah and New York City to
the width of a fiber optic cable. An unshaven hippie backpacker would
hardly be a novelty to a Navajo teen today, linked up as they are by MTV,
Fox, HBO, and so on. Krakauer's sympathetic version of McCandless's
story indicates that if our hyper-consumptive, hyper-developed society
had not made it so hard for a youth to, in a sense, initiate himself,
McCandless would not have had to go to such manic extremes. He would
look a lot more like a harmless romantic than a laughable nut-case.
Yet, like those who seek to "bag" the peak of the highest mountain
in the world, both McCandless and Ruess are as much products of our
culture as they are rejections of it. The extremity with which they attempt
to seek "real" experiences speaks of and to a strain of hyperbole that is
endemic to American life. The activities toward which Sax points us in
some sense are an antidote to this. If we could learn to engage quietly,
hiking along a babbling creek, we could gain all of the benefits embodied
in the notion of contemplative recreation, could we not? Yet is this in-
evitable drift toward extremity also embodied in the Sax ideal? The de-
piction of nature as a place to go to seek improvement, a place guarded
closely in national parks and other designated public lands, creates a
conceptual gap between nature and humans that obscures the essence of
what we seek to experience in nature-a dissolution of the self. At the
same time, the conceptual gap leads us to the notion that we need to go
further and further "over there," and "into the wild," away from all of the
social forces that appear to constrain us, in order to get at something like
our true selves. Yet if our sense of ourselves "out there in nature" is un-
connected ethically to the rest of society, then nature has no defense to
the changing-and increasingly extreme-needs of that society. Rather
than being a laboratory in which we practice the kinds of ideals that we
would like to export, as Sax argues it should be, it will become an in-
creasingly unreflective playground and proving ground subject to myriad
forms of exploitation.
Thus, despite their apparent differences, Ruess and McCandless both
sought to escape the social connections that are necessary to engage in




the kinds of practices that will preserve the environment. On the one
hand, McCandless was not as bad as he appeared to be, but on the other
Ruess was not as good. The "lone explorer" ideal fosters the sense that
we ought to sever all social ties to one another in order to forge intimate
connections with nature. 7' Yet this perpetuates a false dichotomy: peo-
ple, or nature. As environmental writer Val Plumwood has put it, "It is
not the absence of humans that we seek in our wilderness quest .... It is
the experience of the presence of nature, the company of vast, multiple
and prior presences .... We may or may not choose to travel alone, but a
quest for human absence is an entirely different quest from the quest for
the company of nature at large which is at the heart of the 'wilderness
experience."" 7 The dichotomy is particularly ironic in the case of Ruess,
who was traveling in a "wilderness" of the Navajo people's making.'
The dichotomy also distracts us from facing up to phenomena like the
consumption of wilderness. If we view wilderness as some separate, in-
violable entity, we will remain oblivious to the ways in which our own ac-
tions change both our notions and expectations of wilderness, and there-
fore also alter the physical environments contained therein.
Francis Fukuyama declared that the demise of the Soviet Union por-
tended the end of history. 74 A century earlier, Frederick Jackson Turner
propounded the thesis of the end of the American frontier.' Likewise,
one might conclude that the Age of Explornography indicates the end of
Wilderness, at least as a context for reflective engagement. If the percep-
tion is that one needs to go to such concocted extremes to "feel alive,"
then perhaps the ideal of the secular prophets is no longer relevant. But
many have critiqued "The End of ... ." paradigm itself. History, even the
history of clashing ideologies, has not ended. The frontier myth, as well
as its prematurely announced demise, has been roundly and aptly criti-
cized.'76 Likewise, it is too soon to announce that the consumption of
wilderness portends its demise as a place of redemption. Indeed, one of
the confusing messages from the consumption of wilderness is that some
17' See Val Plumwood, Wilderness Skepticism and Wilderness Dualism, in THE GREAT
NEW WILDERNESS DEBATE 652, 682 (J. Baird Callicott & Michael P. Nelson eds., 1998)
(noting that in places we deem to be wild, it is the presence and company of nature that
make the experiences uniquely satisfying, not the absence of humans).
172 ld; see also Sagoff, supra note 6, at 410 ("[T]he challenge to environmentalism to-
day-to our cultural response to environmental problems-is to describe the natural world
and to evaluate our actions toward it in ways that presuppose not opposition but commu-
nity between nature and mankind.").
"I See Plumwood, supra note 171, at 652, 663-66 (noting that the dichotomy tends, as
a general matter, to erase the presence of indigenous people who have lived within and
shaped wilderness areas).
74 See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992).
171 FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY (Dover Publi-
cations 1996) (1920).
'76 See generally PATRICIA LIMERICK, THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST (1987) (arguing that
the history of the West is about more than just the frontier).
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version of Sax's ideal does indeed live on quite forcefully in the minds of
many, and needs to be made increasingly available and relevant. At the
same time, the ideal needs to be contextualized and reformulated to meet
and calm the rapacious demands of a society that clambers ignorantly for
what it believes nature and wilderness offer. The metaphor for how to
engage should be neither McCandless/Ruess nor Tierney, the former view-
ing it necessary to exclude family and community, and the latter needing
to simulate extremity in order to stimulate engagement. An appropriate
metaphor must somehow account for and value the social web in which
we are all entangled as well as the larger biological and ecological web
without which we could not, or at least would not want to, survive.
D. The Ecotourism Alternative
Alongside the plethora of adventure travel opportunities, the last two
decades have witnessed the growth of a more environmentally and so-
cially conscious method of travel dubbed "ecotourism." Ecotourism is
defined as low impact nature tourism that aims to preserve species as well as
local cultures.177 Ecotourism proponents and experts assert that it satisfies
multiple conservation and development objectives, including: generation
of financial support for the protection and management of natural areas;
economic benefits for local residents; support for conservation among local
residents; and, for the eco-tourists, immersion in and appreciation of lo-
cal nature and culture.178 Ecotourism aspires to further the norms em-
bodied in Sax's contemplative recreation ideal, but also incorporates rec-
ognition of the social context in which such recreation occurs. The con-
sumption of wilderness indicates that wilderness exposure alone does not
necessarily change people's behaviors and values. Thus it is not surpris-
ing that a value-laden approach to nature travel would arise, attempting
to incorporate environmental and social objectives.
The term "ecotourism" has been used as a marketing label for many
enterprises that do not adhere to some or any of the above-described ob-
jectives. Increasing numbers of tourists are seeking travel experiences in
developing or under-developed countries, often in order to view wildlife
177 The precise semantics differ, but various texts on and studies of ecotourism con-
verge on substantially similar wording. See, e.g., FENNELL, supra note 75, at 35-36;
ELIZABETH Boo, ECOTOURISM: THE POTENTIALS AND PITFALLS 2-3 (1990); ECOTOURISM:
A SUSTAINABLE OPTION? 1 (Erlet Cater & Gwen Lowman eds., 1994) ("[Ecotourism]
should mean travel to enjoy the world's amazing diversity of natural life and human culture
without causing damage to either").
17 See Kreg Lindberg et al., Ecotourism Questioned: Case Studies from Belize, 23
ANNALS ToURIsM RES. 542, 543 (1996) (listing first three objectives); Boo, supra note
177, at 3 ("The main point is that the person who practices ecotourism has the opportunity




and unique natural areas.179 Capitalizing on this increased interest in na-
ture-oriented travel, private tour companies use the label "eco-travel" or
"ecotourism" without implementing any of the policies that are necessary
to ensure local involvement or cultural and environmental sensitivity.180
Regions in developing or underdeveloped countries that have excep-
tional natural areas and wildlife are particularly susceptible to exploita-
tion of the term.' They face a potential onslaught of interested tourists,
bringing with them the lure of economic advantage. These same locales of-
ten lack the infrastructure or governmental organization necessary to im-
plement effective policies for ensuring that ecotourism objectives are
met."'82 At the same time, the potential ecotourist may lack the ability or
willingness to discern among various travel packages, all of which use the
appealing "eco" label.'83 Indeed, many travel companies seize upon the
pseudo-event version of the present-day traveler's environmental commit-
ments when these companies purport to offer environmental sensitivity, cul-
tural awareness, and "unparalleled luxury" all at once." n One travel com-
pany that provides fancy accommodations in several African countries quite
explicitly promises that there are no losers in its brand of eco-tourism.
"Commercial viability, ecological sustainability and the sharing of economic
benefits with local communities underscore CC Africa's projects. CC Af-
rica offers an Africa of vast wild spaces and unparalleled luxury, em-
braced by a commitment to care-of the land, the wildlife and the peo-
ple."8 5
This sounds good; is it too good to be true? Can one truly have "un-
paralleled" luxury in some of the poorest nations in the world without
adverse environmental and cultural effects? Or is this just another version
' See Boo, supra note 177, at 2-3 (confirming growth in nature-inspired tourism);
Robert Prosser, Societal Change and the Growth in Alternative Tourism, in EcOTOURISM: A
SUSTAINABLE OPTION, supra note 177, at 19 (noting that the highest rates of tourism
growth are in newly industrialized and less developed countries).
180 See FENNELL, supra note 75, at xvii-xviii (discussing inconsistency between the
philosophical basis of ecotourism and its practical implementation).
181 See Lisa Mastny, The Caves of Belize: Explorations on the Edge of Ecotourism,
WORLD WATCH, Sept./Oct. 2001, at 32 (interviewing Ian Anderson, proprietor of the Caves
Branch Adventure Co. and Jungle Lodge in Belize).
182 See generally Boo, supra note 177 (studying ecotourism in developing countries
and finding that lack of oversight can undermine ecotourist goals).
183 See FENNELL, supra note 75, at 278-79 (suggesting, among other things, that there
be more truth in labeling in the context of green tourism); see also DEBORAH MCLAREN,
RETHINKING TOURISM AND ECOTRAVEL: THE PAVING OF PARADISE AND WHAT YOU CAN
Do TO STOP IT (1998) (providing a critique of most forms of tourism, highlighting the
environmental harms carried out under the justification of catering to foreign tourists, and
suggesting instead a politically engaged approach to foreign travel).
'1 See CC Africa, A Company Overview, at http://www.ccafrica.com/aboutus/company.
asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2003). CC Africa, short for Conservation Corporation of Africa,
boasts that it was "established against the background of the rising international demand
for ecotourism and wilderness experiences and in the belief that business could reap viable
financial returns through the long term investment in commercial conservation." Id.
185 Id.
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of a promise that one can climb Everest risk-free? One has reason to be
skeptical, and in reality most such claims are sorely under-evaluated.
8 6
There are, however, some spectacularly documented failures. In Thai-
land, sea-kayaking into limestone caves has gone from eco-friendly to
eco-threatening. An American, John Gray, started a commercial venture
with all of the motivations of the best eco-businessman: "Blend local
people, uncompromising standards and sound management, and you'll not
only have a business that's sustainable for nature, but for making money
as well."'87 Today, he characterizes his expectations as "fantasy land."'88
When Gray started his business, he limited the daily visitors he took to
the spectacular interior lagoons to fifty, hired an all-local staff, provided
excellent training and compensation, and lectured the paying clients on
proper cave etiquette.8 9 Then, the competition got in on it. Nineteen ad-
ditional sea-kayaking tours now cater to eager foreigners. The result is
that as many as 1,000 kayakers enter the delicate caves daily, and their
behavior cannot be controlled. They break off stalactites, and their noise
level scares away local wildlife."9 Gray concludes: "'Eco-tourism rolls
off the tongue quite easily. But quite honestly, there's very little around
.... Looking back on it, I don't know if we did the right thing by com-
mercializing caves."' Despite ecotourism's promise, Gray's experience
indicates that the buying and selling of nature can rarely avoid the mate-
rial consequences of consumption; in other words, there is no non-
consumptive consumption.
Nonetheless, ecotourism's promise lies in the explicit link between
the cultural conditions necessary for the preservation of the environment
and the traveler's subjective experience of nature and culture. The idea en-
tails educating travelers about their impacts, environmental and cultural,
as well as educating them about a foreign place.
Simultaneously, it entails educating locals, within the parameters of
their society and culture, about the benefits they can achieve by preserv-
ing their environments. The studies evaluating various projects demon-
strate that achieving the multiple objectives of ecotourism requires hard
186 See generally Boo, supra note 177 (studying status and effects of ecotourism in
Latin America and the Caribbean, and noting the relative dearth of such evaluative studies
in other regions); see also ECOTOURISM: A SUSTAINABLE OPTION?, supra note 177 (in-
cluding case studies evaluating ecotourism relative to the goals of environmental and cul-
tural sustainability, several of which note the high level of tourist-sensitivity and local
management necessary for true "ecotourist" outcomes); MCLAREN, supra note 183, at 97-
114 (suggesting that ecotourism is an oxymoron and that only broad policies supportive of
local communities and their environments can meet the objectives of environmental and
cultural sustainability).
117 Denis D. Gray, Eco-tours Take Turn for Worse: Kayakers Spoiling Thai Sea Caves,
DENY. POST, July 11, 1999, at IA.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 24A.
190 Id. at IA.
'9' Id. at 24A.
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work by all involved. 92 Ironically, the overly bureaucratic ways in which
ecotourism is discussed and evaluated may undermine some of the moti-
vations of the best-intentioned eco-travelers. Like Everett Ruess and Chris
McCandless, in part they seek freedom and transformation. 193 Some seek
"interludes where the conventions and common transactions of life are
lifted."'194 The scale at which the relatively privileged among us seek the
restorative and transporting benefits of nature travel may mean, however,
that becoming Everett Ruess in this sense might be yet another "illusion
with which we deceive ourselves."'195 The lessons from ecotourism in-
clude the possible need to let go of some of our personal demands for
freedom and self-expression in order to preserve the places that offer us
glimpses of those same ideals.
IV. TOWARD AN ETHICAL BASIS FOR ALL INTERACTIONS WITH NATURE,
FROM WILD TO MILD
Professor Sax frames the argument for untrammeled nature in ethical
terms, yet avoids the philosophical problem of ascribing moral value to
non-human species and inanimate objects. His argument, like Olmsted's
before him, is anthropocentric. Humans are capable of moral improvement,
and therefore we ought to take policy steps to provide room-literally-for
that to occur. Yet the consumption of wilderness has the potential to un-
dermine, on an empirical level, the Saxian ideal. Despite exposure to
congenial conditions for moral improvement, and even despite the appar-
ent motivation to engage in endeavors that will challenge and enliven,
many people fail to transform themselves. And in the process, those con-
ditions-areas of wild and relatively untrammeled beauty-are degraded.
While non-motorized recreation is not nearly as damaging to delicate
ecosystems as motorized recreation or extractive industry, neither is it
without any deleterious impacts. The consumption of wilderness calls
into question one of the premises of Sax's ethical argument for preserva-
tion-that we can take our tired, exhausted bodies into the wilderness
and the wilderness will improve us. It also points us toward a more inter-
active argument based upon the qualities that inhere in wild places, such
as their intact ecosystems and resident flora and fauna, and their capacity
'92 See, e.g., Chandra P. Gurung & Maureen De Coursey, The Annapurna Conservation
Area Project: A Pioneering Example of Sustainable Tourism?, in ECOTOURISM: A Sus-
TAINABLE OPTION?, supra note 177, at 177-93 (concluding that tourism must be managed
at "both macro and micro levels" in order to achieve sustainability); see also Lindberg et
al., supra note 178 (evaluating ecotourism objectives at case study sites in Belize).
193 See FENNELL, supra note 75, at 49.
194 DAVID ZURICK, ERRANT JOURNEYS: ADVENTURE TRAVEL IN A MODERN AGE 13
(1995) (noting distinctions between "adventure travelers" and "ecotourists" and attributing
the above-quoted motivation to adventure travelers. It is safe to assume, however, that there
is a great deal of overlap in the two groups.).
'95 See BOORSTIN, supra note 5 1, at 5.
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to awaken in us a sense of engagement, wonder, and belonging. In other
words, the consumption of wilderness highlights the importance of ar-
riving at a recognition of nature's inherent value, while simultaneously
acknowledging the inescapably social roots of that recognition.
Because the process of recognizing inherent value is inevitably so-
cial, we should take more direct account of all social and cultural condi-
tions that construct the terms of our interaction with wild places. One of
the lessons from the consumerist wilderness frenzy is that despite com-
mercialization, many people do feel some visceral tug toward nature and
the intensity it offers. Even John Tierney, the cynical Manhattanite, be-
came wistful when recalling how "alive" he felt breaking new trail under
dazzling skies. Chrysler is knowingly capitalizing on that same feeling
when it creates advertisements to sell us super-sized SUVs. At a very
powerful level, Sax and his secular prophets are right-we all (or at least
many of us) long for nature and what it offers us. Yet if we ground our
longings solely in the subjective argument that nature has the capacity to
improve us, we are at a loss to explain how and why it fails to do so in
the face of its increasing commodification. In addition, we are unable to
explain why we should care that our well-intended exploits harm nature.
After all, if nature's value is purely instrumental to humanity, why should
it matter that we are commodifying natural experiences?
In order to rescue the ethics of preservation from this subjectivity
problem, we need to incorporate the recognition that natural objects have
value in their own right, and that in fact this is precisely why we, as a
subjective matter, experience so much fulfillment in nature.' 96 We derive a
sense of nature's value based upon our subjective experiences of nature
as redemptive and life-affirming. Yet if we fail to translate that into a
sense that natural places, including the flora and fauna that inhabit them,
have value of their own, we risk destroying the very connections we seek.
Before going further, we should explore the historical evolution, and
some of the intellectual tensions, within this notion of nature having in-
herent value.
A. Historical Roots of the European-American Recognition of
Nature's Value
Today we take for granted that there are various sophisticated argu-
ments in support of moral consideration for nature or its constituent
parts. "'97 Environmental ethicists catalogue the positions, using increas-
19 For a parallel discussion concerning the limitations of the subject-object dichotomy,
see generally Theodor Adomo, Subject and Object, in THE ESSENTIAL FRANKFURT
SCHOOL READER (Andrea Arato & Bike Gebhart eds., Oxford 1978) (1969).
"I See RODERICK FRAZIER NASH, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE 121-60 (1989) (describing




ingly specific taxonomies to identify a range of anthropocentric justifica-
tions, and to attempt to distinguish these from inherent value positions.198
The intellectual forebears of the American preservation movement did
not write with these taxonomies in mind. As minority thinkers in their
time, they stand out because they had anything positive to say about na-
ture and wilderness at all. Yet the sense emerges from their writings that
nature's value cannot be reduced to a mere subset of human preferences.
In the first half of the nineteenth century, Ralph Waldo Emerson de-
scribed his relationship with nature in terms that became known as "tran-
scendentalist": "Standing on the bare ground,-my head bathed by the
blithe air and uplifted into infinite space,-all mean egotism vanishes. I
become a transparent eyeball; I am nothing; I see all; the currents of the
Universal Being circulate through me."' 99 Departing from the dominant
Anglo-European view of nature-that it was something to be conquered
for the benefit of man2 '-Emerson articulated a minority view that would
eventually come to be accepted by many. In nature, we glimpse a tran-
scendent power, and through nature become a part of that universal and
benevolent spirit. While this may sound similar to Sax's secular moral
improvement argument, transcendentalism accords more weight to the
objects of transcendence-here the objects of nature.
Also in the transcendentalist camp, Henry David Thoreau popular-
ized the notion of living intimately with nature when he wrote of his ex-
periences living in a cabin at Walden Pond. It is quite evident from Tho-
reau's description of his motivations that he was seeking something very
similar to what Ruess, McCandless, and even many who climb Everest
seek-intensity of experience, and an awakening of the soul:
I went to the woods because I wished to live deliberately, to
front only the essential facts of life, and see if I could not learn
what it had to teach, and not, when I came to die, discover that I
had not lived .... I wanted to live deep and suck out all the
marrow of life, to live so sturdily and Spartan-like as to put to
rout all that was not life, to cut a broad swath and shave close,
to drive life into a corner, and reduce it to its lowest terms, and,
if it proved to be mean, why then to get the whole and genuine
meanness of it, and publish its meanness to the world; or if it
'1 See, e.g., Michael P. Nelson, An Amalgamation of Wilderness Preservation Argu-
ments, in THE GREAT NEW WILDERNESS DEBATE 154-98 (J. Baird Callicott & Michael P.
Nelson eds., 1998) (providing refined distinctions among justifications).
199 RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Nature, in SELECTED ESSAYS 39 (Larzer Ziff ed., 1982)
(1836).
2°0See RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND (3d ed. 1982) (pro-
viding historical account of the evolution of American attitudes toward wilderness and
arguing that early European and American views took nature and wilderness as hostile
places to be subdued and conquered).
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were sublime, to know it by experience, and be able to give a
true account of it in my next excursion.2"'
Yet Thoreau was describing a venture that, today, would be laughably
domestic. He went to the edge of Concord and lived in a cabin that was
accessible to regular visitors. 202 Thoreau's method of "living deeply" in-
volved becoming intimately familiar with these lovely, yet humble, sur-
roundings, and tracking the cycles of nature in which he was participat-
ing. He knew, for example, every type of fish, frog, and turtle found in
Walden and the surrounding ponds, and appeared to take great delight in
them despite their lack of exoticness or grandeur.2 3 Thoreau referred to
such creatures, and even to inanimate objects such as stars, as his fellows
and neighbors. And in a clear refutation of the human-resource based
view of nature predominant in his time, Thoreau objected to agricultural
clearing of trees and underbrush. 2 4 As Roderick Nash observes, "Tho-
reau seemed to imply that nature should have legal rights like other op-
pressed minorities. 25
John Muir, founder of the Sierra Club (and also arguably the founder
of modern American environmental activism),2 6 also voiced sentiments
about the ego-dissolving qualities of immersion in nature: "You cannot
feel yourself out of doors .... You bathe in these spirit-beams, turning
round and round, as if warming at a camp-fire. Presently you lose con-
sciousness of your own separate existence: you blend with the landscape,
and become part and parcel of nature. '207 Emerson, Thoreau, and Muir
describe their own personal experiences of a sense of the universal-that
nature allows us to dissolve into something larger than ourselves, thereby
making us all the more aware of the value of our own individual lives.20 8
For all three, but particularly for Threau and Muir, their subjective expe-
riences of joy and pleasure translate into a recognition of nature's intrin-
sic value. Muir made this explicit: "I have never yet happened upon a
201 HENRY DAVID THOREAU, Walden, in WALDEN AND OTHER WRITINGS BY HENRY
DAVID THOREAU 105, 172-73 (Joseph Wood Krutch ed., 1981) (1854).
202 See id. at 196, 208.
203 See id. at 187.
204 See NASH, supra note 197, at 37.
205 Id.
216 Muir published many wilderness essays, but he also worked avidly on campaigns to
protect public lands from development and encroachment. His most famous political battle
was one he lost-the fight to prevent the Hetch Hetchy Valley of Yosemite from being
flooded to create a reservoir for San Francisco's water needs. See NASH, supra note 200, at
161-81; see also Oliver Houck, Unfinished Stories, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 867, 911-12
(2002) (describing Muir's role as founder of the Sierra Club).
207 John Muir, Twenty Hill Hollow, in WILDERNESS ESSAYS 88 (Peregrine Smith 1980)
(1872).
208 Other influential forebears of the inherent-value-of-nature position include Albert
Schweitzer, Henry S. Salt, and, of course, Charles Darwin. See RODERICK FRAZIER NASH,




trace of evidence that seemed to show that any one animal was ever made
for another ai much as it was made for itself."2°9
Despite the powerful influence Emerson, Thoreau, and Muir had on
the evolution of environmental thought, none consciously articulated an
ethic of wilderness preservation. Aldo Leopold took these early transcen-
dentalist/universalist views a step further with his outline of a "land ethic,"
published posthumously in 1949.210 Like Muir, Leopold was a writer-
activist who pressed for the preservation of public lands. Leopold's expe-
riences in the desert Southwest as a Forest Service assistant from roughly
1916 to 1918, as well as the time he spent tending to and restoring the
indigenous flora and fauna on his Wisconsin farm, transformed him from
a conventional resource-based thinker to a proponent of the idea that hu-
mans are on an ethical continuum with all animals and plants.211
Leopold's "Land Ethic" first recognizes that humans are members of
a community larger than that of their own species. He argues, though not
precisely in these terms, that there is nothing a priori about limiting
one's relevant community to humans. In fact, ecological history informs
us otherwise:
That man is, in fact, only a member of a biotic team is shown by
an ecological interpretation of history. Many historical events,
hitherto explained solely in terms of human enterprise, were
actually biotic interactions between people and land. The char-
acteristics of the land determined the facts quite as potently as
the characteristics of the men who lived on it.2t2
Leopold also relies upon the unique human capacity to recognize and
mourn the loss of other species as a basis for his argument that we have
an ethical obligation to prevent such loss, where possible.2t3 Further, even
more explicitly than Emerson, Thoreau, and Muir before him, Leopold
articulated that there was something elemental, and elementally good,
about intimate contact with nature:
[T]here is value in any experience that reminds us of our de-
pendency on the soil-plant-animal-man food chain, and of the
fundamental organization of the biota. Civilization has so clut-
209See Nash, supra note 197, at 40 (quoting John Muir, Wild Wool, OVERLAND
MONTHLY, Apr. 1875, at 20).210 See ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 237-64 (Ballantine Books 1991)
(1949).
21' See generally id. (chronicling Leopold's experiences with nature and culminating in
his articulation of the Land Ethic).
212 See id. at 241. More recently, Jared Diamond has advanced this hypothesis. See JA-
RED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS AND STEEL (1997).
213 See LEOPOLD, supra note 210, at 116-19.
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tered this elemental man-earth relation with gadgets and mid-
dlemen that awareness of it is growing dim.214
Leopold puts all of these assertions together to conclude that we are ethi-
cally responsible to ensure the overall health of the biotic community.
Until Leopold made this morally based defense of policies and prac-
tices that protect nature for its own sake, no one in the mainstream, Euro-
pean-American tradition had done so. Leopold's bold effort was to attach
the familiar moral terms "right" and "wrong" to our interactions with
nature; the Land Ethic is simply this: "A thing is right when it tends to
preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is
wrong when it tends otherwise. '215 What Leopold hoped for was an inter-
nalization of the Land Ethic by every American, such that debates about
land use would be informed by it rather than purely by economic value.216
The question we are left with is one Leopold recognized: how to get from
the articulation of the Land Ethic to its internalization.
B. Ecocentric Philosophy
More recently, and largely since Sax published Mountains without
Handrails, the pro-nature sentiments of Muir, Emerson, and Thoreau, and
the proto-ethics of Leopold, have been reexamined, systematized, and
incorporated into myriad philosophical and ethical arguments in support
of nature.217 Indeed, Sax was near the leading edge of this now-burgeoning
field when he published Mountains in 1980. As discussed above, Sax
avoids the thorny philosophical difficulty of ascribing moral value to
non-human entities by justifying preservation policies based upon our
subjective experiences concerning the goods associated with non-motorized
recreation. Like Sax, some environmental ethicists hew closely to anthropo-
centric justifications. 211 Other approaches make an explicit case for a non-
anthropocentric account of nature's value.219
214 Id. at 212 (noting that the consuming wilderness phenomenon has cluttered even
our recreational relationship to nature with "gadgets and middlemen").
215 Id. at 262.
216 See id. at 250-51 (commenting on the futility of relying solely on the government
to protect natural resources and articulating the need for private land-owners to internalize
values of preservation).
217 See NASH, supra note 208, at 122 (discussing the emergence of environmental eth-
ics as a legitimate field).
21 See, e.g., Bryan G. Norton, Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism, in EN-
VIRONMENTAL ETHICS: DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE, supra note 110, at 313-15 (ar-
guing that weak anthropo-centrism provides all the justification needed for strong ecologi-
cal policies).
219 See John Rodman, Four Forms of Ecological Consciousness Reconsidered, in DEEP
ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 121 (George Sessions ed., 1995). Rodman
summarizes the various schools of environmental ethics, and describes Deep Ecology and
its predecessors, like Leopold's Land Ethic, as the emergence of the "ecological sensibil-
ity." Id. at 125-29.
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1. Asserting Nature's Intrinsic Value
Environmental philosophies that assert an intrinsic value to nature
draw upon a patchwork of philosophic traditions, including mainstream
neo-Kantian arguments, the continental philosophies of Heidegger and
Spinoza, and an amalgam of eastern and Native American religions and
philosophies.20 The unifying concept is a moral view that places humans
in a larger midst of morally relevant entities-a view that has become
known as "ecocentric," to contrast with anthropocentric.
Like Leopold, ecocentrists rely in part on the biological connections
between and among species to support a corresponding moral web. Eco-
centric theorists are aware, however, of the difficulty involved in justify-
ing the moral agency of non-human, and particularly inanimate, enti-
ties.2 2 1 Some ecocentrists address the problem by asserting as a first prin-
ciple that other natural objects have intrinsic value. They recognize the
futility of making reasoned arguments to arrive at the initial non-anthropo-
centric moral view. They hold that as a descriptive matter, we come to
care about nature through a process of identification that is theoretically
universally possible for every human.22 Thus for many of the ecocentric
theorists, relating to nature is the keystone to moral thought and action.223
Ecocentrists recognize that their views about nature's value are not
held by many people. Rather hopefully, some ascribe to the possibility of
a paradigm shift in order for all of society to achieve the ethical orienta-
tion to which ecocentrists subscribe.2 4 But it is one thing to refuse to
follow philosophical justification over the precipice; it is quite another to
hope for a cultural paradigm shift without attending to the question of
how it might happen.
220 See BILL DEVALL & GEORGE SESSIONS, DEEP ECOLOGY 79-108 (1985) (summariz-
ing sources for the Deep Ecology perspective).
221 See, e.g., J. Baird Callicot, The Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic, in ENVI-
RONMENTAL ETHICS: DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE, supra note 110, at 425, 434-35
(addressing this difficulty in the context of an in-depth analysis and defense of the philo-
sophical richness of Leopold's Land Ethic).
22 2 See MICHAEL E. ZIMMERMAN, CONTESTING EARTH'S FUTURE: RADICAL ECOLOGY
AND POSTMODERNITY 47-48 (1994).
223 See id. at 38-39. Zimmerman notes that several deep ecologists have turned to Spi-
noza for a philosophical account of inter-relatedness. Spinoza maintained that all things
are inter-related manifestations of God and Nature (one and the same in his account).
Contrary to the Hobbesian account of life being a constant battle of all against all, life for
Spinoza was a joyful process of self-realization. The struggle for preservation was, or
should be, a simultaneous reckoning with all other forms of life. Spinoza's non-dualist
concepts laid the groundwork for inter-relatedness as a basis of moral theory.
224 DEEP ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 219, at ix.
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2. Hoping for a Paradigm Shift
Whatever the philosophical merits of ecocentric positions, advocates
for the intrinsic value of nature face a real world problem: most people in
the developed world do not share their views. It is essential, from this prac-
tical perspective, to assess the likelihood of the hoped-for paradigm shift.
At this point, it might be helpful to categorize several different strands of
ecocentrism. 225
The first, "moral-progress ecocentrism," addresses the problem of the
paradigm shift by assuming a progressive evolution of human morality.
Drawing initially on Heidegerrian ideas about the type of shift necessary
to turn away from anthropocentrism-a drastic reorientation of values
that prioritizes connection to nature-these theorists then depart from
Heidegger's anti-modernism by adopting a notion of moral progress.
226
Heidegger held that only an unpredictable, non-linear turn could cause
the shift. Moral-progress ecocentrists suggest, alternatively, that human-
ity may be gradually maturing toward ecocentrism. 227 While some eco-
centrists deny that there is any moral-progress thread to their philosophy,
Michael Zimmerman argues that there must be "at least a critical version
of historical maturation or evolution, [or there is] no apparent basis for
expecting a paradigm shift that will move Western culture towards eco-
centrism . 28
The type of moral progress envisioned by Zimmerman and others is
essentially personal. Zimmerman suggests that the move toward a Hei-
deggerian transcendentalism is a prerequisite to overcoming Western
anxieties about mortality and isolation. These anxieties, he argues, form
the basis of our consumerist, authoritarian, dominance-based culture.
Zimmerman acknowledges that this emphasis on personal transformation
is criticized by some, "who say that such ideas neglect capitalism's role
in shaping individual consciousness and in destroying ecosystems.
229
However, he responds that such critics have "never dealt effectively with
the possibility that death denial has helped to encourage capital accumu-
lation, authoritarianism, and hierarchy. Arguably, so long as people re-
quire immortality symbols, wealth, status, and violence will continue to
be popular."230
A second strand, "hard wired ecocentrism," posits that we can achieve
the cultural shift by way of bur genetic code. By living in industrialized
societies, we have strayed from our genetic roots as hunters and gatherers
225 The following is not intended to be an exhaustive account of the various positions
within the ecocentric camp, which has grown diverse and garrulous.
226 See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 222, at 119-20.
221 See id.




under Pleistocene conditions."' We must therefore reintroduce the wild,
both in culture and nature, in order to survive. Paul Shepard, the primary
proponent of this position, states that:
Wildness is a genetic state. Wilderness is a place we have dedi-
cated to the wildness, both in our selves and in other species.
The home of wildness is both etymologically and biologically
wilderness. Although we define ourselves in terms of national-
ity, race, profession, and so on, it is evident that the context of
our being in the past is wilderness-to which, one might say,
our genes look expectantly for those circumstances that are their
optimal ambience, a genetic expectation of our genome that is
unfulfilled in the world we have created.232
While Shepard includes suggestions concerning how to reconstruct our
social institutions to allow for this return to the wild, the general thrust is
that we will be led there by our genes.
Arne Naess, a leading figure among ecocentrists, and in particular
among those who self-identify as "deep ecologists," does not subscribe to
the hard-wired view. Rather, Naess theorizes a third strand, herein called
"pluralist ecocentrism. ' 233 Naess attempts to offer a non-linear, culturally
contingent account of the ecocentric shift. He rejects the notion that a
single moral paradigm can account for how we ascribe value, yet he is
(admittedly irrationally) optimistic that "the increasingly influential, plu-
ralistic ecology movement will let humanity muddle through its current
problems." 234
Naess explains his own ecological orientation by describing a proc-
ess of ever-expanding identification with, and therefore empathy for, non-
human entities. He calls this process one of "interdependent self-realiza-
tion," meaning that the self can only become fully realized once it identifies
with all other plants, animals, etc. While this sounds like the sort of uni-
versalist assumption that is open to attack, Naess fends this off by stating
that he does not offer this as a matter of ontology. He is not out to define
what the self is in some absolute, provable sense. He is merely offering
an intuition, from which springs an "assemblage of statements ... provi-
sional and tentative, '235 that attempts to provide a description of how one
might come to an ecocentric position. Further, Naess appears to realize
231 See generally PAUL SHEPARD, COMING HOME TO THE PLEISTOCENE (1998).
232 Id. at 131.
233 See Arne Naess, Ecosophy and Gestalt Ontology, in DEEP ECOLOGY FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 219, at 240-48; Arne Naess, The Place of Joy in a
World of Fact, in DEEP ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 219, at
249-58; see also ZIMMERMAN, supra note 222, at 339.
234 ZIMMERMAN, supra note 222, at 339.
231 Id. at 37.
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that there is and will be an ongoing contest over moralities, including the
morality of various environmental positions. He describes one route to-
ward an ecocentric value orientation, and clearly hopes that this and
other routes will predominate. 23 6
3. Consumption of Wilderness and Ecocentrism
Ecocentrism provides us with the vocabulary and value orientation
necessary to critique the destruction of wilderness. If non-human species
and entire ecosystems exist not merely as elements in an anthropocentric
utilitarian calculus or as extensions of human moral characteristics, but
as entities with moral value in their own right, then we should refrain from
taking actions that treat them solely as means to our own self-fulfillment.
A difficulty emerges, however, if one takes the consumption of wilder-
ness into account. If identification with nature, whether as a product of
moral progress, hard-wiring, or self-realization, is an essential explana-
tion of the move toward an ecocentric worldview, how can one respond to
the observation that many wilderness consumers identify solely through
the medium of their SUV? Or, even more challengingly, how is ecocen-
trism consistent with experiences where consumers identify with nature only
a la explornography, or after spending relatively large sums of money on
travel, equipment, and guides, and then still fail to reorient their values?
The consumption of wilderness challenges the "moral progress" the-
ory of the move toward ecocentrism, in that while some segments of
Western society may be progressing toward an ecocentric, anti-consump-
tionist, death-accepting worldview, others are simultaneously moving
toward heightened forms of anthropocentric, death-denying, rapaciously
consumptive worldviews. As we have seen, technology and wealth have
enabled us to deny death even in places where death is the most logical
and predictable state for humans to occupy. Places, such as Antarctica,
where once people dared only to go in the most auspicious conditions,
and with the wildest ambition of mere survival, today become racecourses
for bored urbanite marathoners. 237 As Zimmerman acknowledges, a growing
awareness of inter-connectedness does not lead inexorably to an ecologi-
cal sensibility:
236 See Arne Naess, Self Realization: An Ecological Approach to Being in the World, in
DEEP ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 219, at 239:
The richness of reality is becoming even richer through our specific human en-
dowments; we are the first kind of living beings we know of which have the po-
tentialities of living in a community with all other living beings. It is our hope
that all these potentialities will be realized-if not in the immediate future, then at
least in the somewhat near future.
Id. (emphasis added).
13' See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
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Today, people are becoming more aware of humanity's interde-
pendence with life on earth. But far from leading to an ecologi-
cal sensibility that might help to trigger a social 'phase shift,'
such growing ecological awareness could be factored into mar-
ket decision making and government planning in a way that
simply reinforces anthropocentric ... consciousness.238
Yet Zimmerman's response to this problem is circular. He states that without
a directional (and progressive) view of history (and implicitly morality),
we can provide no explanation of why people might move toward eco-
centrism.2 9 Indeed.
The "hard-wired" position-that we are betraying a genetic code by
abandoning a life dictated by nature's rhythms-resonates with some of
the observations by Sax and affirmed herein. The indescribable satisfac-
tion expressed by those who engage directly with the difficulties inherent
in nature has a recurring ring. The anti-modernist sentiments of the early
mountaineers and climbers, as well as the latter-day Everest trudgers,
lend themselves to an account of these emotions as being hard-wired. Yet
the consumption of wilderness, like many trends of recent times, also
undermines any biological account of our aesthetic and emotional sym-
pathies. We seek the extravagance of nature for many reasons, including
the promotion of our own social status. Moreover, we seek it today in
forms that serve largely to perpetuate an economy that will continue to
destroy most natural resources in the absence of rigorous protective poli-
cies.' 4 Thus as tempting as it might be to label these yearnings as some-
how biological, it is also very nafve to do so. It assumes an inevitability
about how such desires will manifest themselves, an inevitability that the
consumption of wilderness seriously contradicts.
The consumption of wilderness informs the pluralist account of an
ecocentric morality by highlighting that more than mere hope is required.
The very intuitions that lead some, like Naess, to experience the larger
connections with nature lead others only so far as their credit cards. The
desire for connection with the wild, when it occurs in a society which has
successfully blurred action with consumption, easily mutates into expres-
sion of extremist behavior that does not serve to bring one closer to inti-
macy with the ecosystem. Thus while Naess expresses a moral worldview
that may be a necessary complement to Sax's subjectivist justifications
for preservation, the problem remains of bridging the gap between that
worldview and the social conditions that would make it possible.
23 ZIMMERMAN, supra note 222, at 338.
239 Id. at 373. Aware of this problem, Zimmerman carefully clarifies that his notion of
moral progress is tied tightly to political action and moreover is not inevitable. See id. at
373-77.
240 See Harsch, supra note 10, at 548-50 (summarizing the literature on the connec-
tions between industrial economies and environmental problems).
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C. Putting Ecological Values in Social Context
At one extreme, Sax avoids any valuation of nature other than as an
ideal backdrop for human engagement and consequent moral improve-
ment. At the other, the ecocentrists discussed above assert the intrinsic
value of nature without credible accounts of how to achieve widespread
acceptance of that assertion. Both Sax and the ecocentrists insufficiently
heed the ways in which culture constructs our conceptions of nature.
Sax's argument depends upon culture being relatively static, such that the
Saxian ideal of how to interact with nature has enduring application.
Ecocentric positions optimistically assume that culture will somehow catch
up to their assertion of nature's intrinsic value. Yet, as discussed above,
both Sax and the ecocentrists also say important and intuitively correct
things about the appeal of nature, as well as its value.
To bridge the gap between the Saxian argument and the ecocentric
assertion, and to achieve greater comprehension of the consumption of
wilderness, we should look more closely at how society and culture me-
diate our concept of nature. Andrew Ross, in his book The Chicago
Gangster Theory of Life,24' makes the point that society both creates and
destroys nature, and not the other way around.242 He criticizes many envi-
ronmentalists for being "oblivious in presuming that the biological ethics
governing their ideas and prescriptions are governed by (higher) natural,
not social laws. '243 Ross summarizes the thesis of his book as follows:
"ideas that draw upon the authority of nature nearly always have their
origins in ideas about society."'
Ross's book provides several insightful cautionary tales of how envi-
ronmental rhetoric can be deployed to further hierarchical, exploitative
social regimes. Throughout his analysis, Ross challenges western di-
chotomies that characterize much of our thinking about the environment.
In a chapter on Polynesia, Ross describes the complicated ways in which
the residents grapple with the legacies of colonialism and the attendant
myths of a primitive, pre-industrial eco-paradise. By mapping "natural"
onto so-called primitive societies, we misperceive the way in which so-
cial hierarchy can result in exhaustion of natural resources even in cul-
tures that have a "nature philosophy" at their core.245 Thus we both ro-
manticize indigenous people and pave the way for non-indigenous groups
to tout their interest in preservation as a means to impose more "modern"
forms of economic and social exploitation.2 6
21 ANDREW Ross, THE CHICAGO GANGSTER THEORY OF LIFE (1994).242 Id. at 15.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 See id. at 21-98.
246 See Ross, supra note 241, at 27-98.
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Ross's approach is very useful in critiquing the consumption of wil-
derness. The social circumstances that produced a society that enables a
relatively small percentage of people to pursue extreme experiences in
the wilderness include, ironically, the estrangement of people who used
to live quite intimately in those same environments. "The American
model [for nature parks] had its origin in John Muir's Yosemite, created
by excluding the Miwok Indians, followed by the eviction of the Ute and
Navajo Indians from Bryce and Zion." '247
In fact, most National Parks of the wilderness variety have histories
involving either exclusion of Native Americans, deprivation of traditional
tribal use rights, or both.248 As Ross and others point out, similar conflicts
between the demands of international nature travel and local communi-
ties are occurring globally. In Uganda's Kidepo National Park, the Ik are
alienated from their traditional hunting grounds.249 In Kenya, conflicts
have arisen between tribal members and the government concerning sub-
sistence hunting in game parks.2 10 In order to create an appropriately
"natural" playground, we commit the decidedly social and political act of
evicting local inhabitants. Reflective recreation is more problematic as a
justification for land use policy when one considers this history.
The historian William Cronon has made a similar point concerning
our conceptions of land as empty, wild, and unused.25 In documenting
the history of ecology and land use patterns in colonial New England,
Cronon describes the different conceptions of land held by Native Ameri-
cans versus the European newcomers. Cronon's investigations led him to
conclude that Native American peoples did alter their natural environ-
ments, but they did so in a way that adapted to the levels of abundance
and scarcity that were dictated by seasonal and local conditions. 52 Simi-
larly, Native conceptions of property rights shifted depending upon eco-
logical use.253 The colonists' view-that the Native peoples simply had no
concept of property rights and that they "wasted" resources-was incor-
rect, but conveniently so for them. It enabled their justifications for seiz-
ing Native lands. 2 4 The perception of ecosystems (though obviously not
labeled as such) differed drastically between the two groups. Native
247 Id. at 92; see also ROBERT H. KELLER & MICHAEL F. TUREK, AMERICAN INDIANS &
NATIONAL PARKS 20 (1998) (recounting the history of how the Miwok/Ahwahneechee
were killed or expelled from the Yosemite Valley twelve years before the creation of the
Park in 1864).
248 See generally Ross, supra note 241.
249 Id. at 92.
250 See Stephen Cook, Environment: Game Plan, Relations Between Kenya's Wildlife
Parks and Neighboring Tribes Are Not All They Should Be, GUARDIAN, Apr. 28, 1999, at
Society Page 4.
21' See WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS AND THE
ECOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND (1983).
112 Id. at 37.
23 Id. at 66-68.
254 Id. at 55-57.
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Americans saw abundance as a reason to adapt their needs and practices
to perpetuate such conditions, whereas the colonists perceived abundance
as a justification for mass exploitation and extraction of resources as in-
dividual commodities.255 The absence of human management is not the
key feature distinguishing lands that appear "natural" versus those that do
not. Rather, human views of the land determine whether their influence will
lead to one set of conditions or the other.56
The point that "nature" is a human artifact does not undermine the
position, however, that there are ethical grounds for constraining our de-
struction of natural resources. In arguing that we derive and create the
meaning of nature as a social rather than a scientific matter, one can go
too far in denying the reality of certain natural limits. For example, Ross
argues that the concept of scarcity, which has been used in economics to
justify various hierarchical social arrangements, is equally anathema to
any non-hierarchical solution to environmental problems. 2 7 But scarcity
means something much more concrete and powerful in the environmental
context. For example, according to Harvard biologist Edward 0. Wilson,
we are in the midst of one of the greatest extinction spasms of geological
history, and it is human-caused. 2 s Giant pandas, Asian and Siberian ti-
gers, Asian rhinoceri, and other so-called "charismatic mega-fauna" are
on the verge of disappearance.2 9 Other less charismatic creatures that
play crucial roles in maintaining environmental health are also vanishing,
or in many cases have already disappeared.260 Forests, ancient and other-
wise, are being destroyed at the rate of one percent every year.261 The dev-
astation of forests has downstream effects, such as loss of habitat for
other species and destruction of watersheds because of erosion. 62 The list
of facts, provided to us by science, goes on.2 63
255 Id. at 166, 168-69.
256 See Charles C. Mann, 1491, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 2002, at 41 (canvassing re-
cent anthropological and historical positions in support of the conclusion that "[b]efore it
became the New World, the Western Hemisphere was vastly more populous and sophisti-
cated than has been thought-and an altogether more salubrious place to live at the time
than, say, Europe.").
27 See Ross, supra note 241, at 271-73.
258 See EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 272-80 (1992).
259 DEEP ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 219, at xv.260 See WILSON, supra note 258, at 283 ("The ecosystems for their part, containing
thousands of less-conspicuous species, are assigned equivalent value .... The humble and
ignored are in fact often the real star species.").
261 Bruce Ledewitz & Robert D. Taylor, Law and the Coming Environmental Catastro-
phe, 21 WM & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 599, 601 (1997).
262 Id. at 601-02.
263 In light of scientific consensus on global loss of biodiversity and global climate
change, the United Nations has sought to address these problems. See Global Status of
Biological Diversity: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. ESCOR, Org. Sess., U.N.
Doc. E/CN.17/2001/PC/18 (2001); Protection of the Atmosphere: Report of the Secretary-




While Ross acknowledges in general terms that concern for the envi-
ronment should be on our list of political priorities, he shies away from
any details. Perhaps he does so because the details indicate that some
things are indeed becoming very scarce. When the giant panda disappears, it
truly will be gone. While we should interpret the social forces that con-
tribute to the near extinction of the panda, and should also accept that its
extinction has no pre-determined meaning absent that interpretation, there is
not much room for interpretation concerning the very fact of its demise.
These natural limits put us in the position of deciding what to do, and
while unfortunately there is no single response that is inevitable, there is one
that circles back to the very same prevalent, yet ultimately subjective,
yearnings that Sax so eloquently describes.
The insight that we construct nature is powerful, and powerfully
demonstrated by the consumption of wilderness. Yet the insight that we
value nature (as problematic as that term may be) precisely because it
makes us feel connected to the universal is equally forceful, and equally
evident in the consumption of wilderness. The feelings of connection
stem from those very physical and very real aspects of nature, such as
mint-green lichens, day-glo salamanders, and big fuzzy giant pandas. The
leap that the ecocentrists make in asserting nature's intrinsic value is de-
fensible because it resonates so strongly with this longing for connection.
And the leap is all the more appealing because of the imminent disap-
pearance of many of the objects of our longing, in the absence of a strong
moral commitment to saving them. The unavoidably difficult work lies in
connecting our subjective intuitions about what we long for to the larger
social world that simultaneously makes possible and threatens our expe-
riences with nature.264
This sort of prescription is admittedly a difficult one to translate into
law and policy. But there are certain directions in which it points. To en-
sure that the natural world can continue to offer us opportunities for en-
gagement and connection, we should support some limits on the terms of
our engagement. As the ecotourism experiences indicate, bureaucracy
and regulation may be required to achieve ecological and cultural goals.
Freedom to roam, ez la Ruess and McCandless, may in some circumstances
have to yield to local culture and ecology. At the same time, home-spun
adventure, in some sense modeled after the initiative exhibited by these
two characters, should be encouraged over extravagant guided escapades.
Freedom to be creative should substitute for freedom to go wherever we
please and can pay for. Otherwise, we risk consuming the very places that,
in the secular/spiritual sense captured by Sax's prophets, consume us.
264 Many have written eloquently on the importance of making these connections. See,
e.g., Gary Paul Nabhan, Cultural Parallax in Viewing North American Habitats, in THE
GREAT NEW WILDERNESS DEBATE, supra note 171, at 628-39; Gary Snyder, The Rediscov-
ery of Turtle Island, in THE GREAT NEW WILDERNESS DEBATE, supra note 171, at 642-51.
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V. CONCLUSION
A winter Sunday in Boulder, and I am running on one of the many
dirt trails that lace through town. This particular trail winds its way
across pastures and through wetlands. The remains of Boulder County's
rural roots predominate here. Cows amble along, chewing the tough grasses
relentlessly. The trail is on a slight rise east of Boulder, so the bustling
city that lies between the plains and the mountains is barely visible. One
gets a sense of what this place looked like to the first homesteaders-vast
skies, rolling prairies, and then those preternatural mountains thrusting
out of the flatlands, appearing to mark the end of the world. My imagina-
tion drifts back to those times whenever I run this trail. Sometimes, my
thoughts recede even further back, to what this valley looked like to the
Arapahoe, Cheyenne, and Ute Indians who made it home before they
were driven out.
Today, I am not the only one being pulled toward the past. As I run
past a group of cows, I notice two calves stumbling clumsily toward each
other, heads half way down. As they approach one another, they give a
sorry imitation of a head butt, and then one of them trips and nearly falls
down. It looks comical, as if these two calves had seen a video of wild
elk sparring, and realized that, despite their undeniable domestication,
they should try their best to follow suit. I snort derisively and think, those
poor things.., responding to some vestige of wilder genetic codes. Then
I imagine them looking at me, running all alone, lycra and polypropylene
from head to toe, feet protected in cushioned, technologically perfected
running shoes. What am I but the human equivalent of the stumbling calves
dreaming of letting loose their inner elk? All three of us are trying to tap
into some ancient rhythm of the wild. All three of us nothing but what we
are, products of thousands of years of humans intertwining with nature.
The explorations of this Article reveal that the calves and I share
much in common with most of us. In this, I believe Professor Sax was right.
The secular prophets are on to something. They long to show us how to
tap into the wild, knowing that at some level this is a widespread, if not
universal, desire. The problem, however, is that in our culture the wild is
an ever-moving target. We must be far more vigilant than we thought,
and go to further extremes, to achieve the connections with nature that
we so deeply desire. The extremes are not necessarily those of physical
prowess, however. Indeed, the Everest example shows that the most ex-
treme physical endeavor can nonetheless become a pseudo-event. Nor are
the extremes those that force us to shun family and community, notwith-
standing the almost-admirable, mostly pitiable escapades of those like
Chris McCandless. Rather they are extremes of insight. We must recog-
nize that the connections we seek to make in wild places must expand
beyond the wholly personal. They extend widely in two seemingly oppo-
site directions. On one side, the connections extend to the very real im-
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pacts that we have on other species and on the health of ecosystems. On
the other, they extend to the human social and political contexts that con-
struct our interactions with all places, including wild ones.
Why should we care about nature? Because we are a part of it, and
because it is nonetheless separate and distinct enough from us in the ob-
jective facts of its existence (again, think about vanishing giant pandas,
devastated forests, decreasing complexity in ecosystems .... ) that if we
are not able care-takers, much of what we seek to find in ourselves, even
in the most commercialized forms of wilderness travel, will be lost. Then
we will be left only with remnants of what we once considered to be na-
ture, and therefore, if the intuitions of the secular prophets and all of the
latter-day-followers are correct, remnants even of ourselves.

